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Abstract 
The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical 
analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the 
technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of 
biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types 
of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been 
more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those 
agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of 
bioterrorism incidents over the past century, but states and substate actors have 
struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include 
acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and 
effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real 
barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing 
technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low 
but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event. 
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Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of 
Biological Weapons Use: 
A Threat Assessment 
1. Introduction 
The concept of using pathogens and toxins in warfare is not new; documented use dates at least to the 
Middle Ages. However, the fall 200 1 anthrax attacks have refocused attention on the issue. Prior to the 
attacks, biological weapons (BW) threat assessments often concluded either that there was no serious 
threat or that the threat was imminent and apocalyptic. The wide disparity of opinion is indicative of an 
ideological divide among the policy makers, academics, and biological weapons experts who conduct the 
threat assessments. The division falls along different methodological approaches used to assess the BW 
threat. 
On one side of the debate are those who conduct their threat assessments based chiefly on the historical 
precedence of biological weapons research, development, and use.’ These threat assessments inevitably 
conclude that the BW threat, particularly by terrorist groups, is both a low probability and a low 
consequence event. These assessments tend to view states as the only actors capable of a large-scale, mass 
casualty, bio-related event (including sponsoring acts of terrorism). Consequently, adherents to this 
perspective support multilateral initiatives to stem the state biological weapon threat. 
On the other side of the debate are those who conduct threat assessments based largely on the scientific 
and technical skills and expertise needed to transform a pathogen or toxin into a biological weapon. 2 
For examples, see: (1) Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or 
Biological Agents,” Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. (2) 
Brian Jenkins, “Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats,” testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. US Senate, November 2001. (3) Jonathan B. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing 
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. (4) Jonathan B. Tucker and 
Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55, JulyiAugust 1999. (4); (5) John 
Parachini, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism,” testimony before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government 
Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 2001. (6) David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the 
Apocalypse,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999. (7) Elisa Hams, “Statement by Elisa Harris.” 
Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform, November 15, 2001. 
httw /www.housc.~wv rcformdrninipdfs pdf‘ corn pdf terrorism bio bricfing harrk tcst.pdf (8) Ehud Sprinzak, 
“The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, 112; Fall 1998. (8) Marie Isabelle Chevrier, “The Threat of 
Chemical and Biological Terrorism is Exaggerated,” Weapons of Mass Destruction (Jennifer Hurley, Ed.), 
Greenhaven Press, 1999. 
1 
For examples, see: (1) Malcolm Dando, The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control. 
Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers; 2001. (2) Kathleen C. Bailey, “Problems with Verifying a Ban on 
Biological Weapons,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Director ’s Series on Proliferation, 3; January 5, 
1994. (3) Mark Wheelis, “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons,” The Nonproliferation Review. 9( 1), Spring 
2002. (4) Steven Block, “Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology,” The New Terror 
Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, (Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. 
9 
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These threat assessments tend to conclude that the threat of biological weapons use is growing as a result 
of the increased availability of dual-use materials and technologies and that the threat of biological 
weapons represents a significant danger. Here, both state and substate actors are considered potential 
aggressors. 
In order to provide a more comprehensive biological weapons threat assessment, this study uses both 
comparative historical analysis and technological as~essment.~ Following the delineation of the historical 
pattern of biological weapons use, the paper then examines the technical record and requirements for 
biological weapons proliferation and use. This secondary analysis looks specifically at the technical 
barriers to creating a mass casualty biological weapon and accompanying delivery system. Once again, 
differing methodologies have produced widely disparate conclusions, in this case regarding the technical 
difficulty of developing and deploying biological weapons. While issues of pathogenicity, lethality, 
transmission rates, and environmental degradation have hampered even well-funded state biological 
weapons programs, substate actors have been able to achieve some success with non-lethal pathogens and 
toxins. Consequently, examining the technical issues surrounding pathogen or toxin manipulation is as 
important as the historical record in understanding the nature of the biological weapons threat. 
We believe this combined approach-which identifies incidents of biological weapons research, 
development, and use (at both the state and substate level), incidents of pathogen or toxin diversion, 
motivations for use, and technical difficulties associated with deploying a biological weapon-results in a 
more holistic threat assessment that can be used to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter the 
biological weapons threat. 
1.1 Terms and Definitions 
Whenever possible, this study relies on commonly used terms and standard definitions for the concepts 
associated with biological weapons research, development, and use. However, several concepts associated 
with aspects of biological weapons work have been poorly defined or are only now becoming part of the 
BW lexicon. Therefore, this section introduces and discusses each concept as it is used throughout the 
study. 
1 .I .I Biological Weapons 
A biological weapon is any pathogen or toxin used as a weapon. Biological weapons that use High 
Consequence Pathogens and Toxins (defined in Section 1.1.5) pose the greatest threat. High Consequence 
Pathogens and Toxins will include those agents that have been selected and/or manipulated in such a way 
Wilson, Eds.), Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999. (5) Raymond Zilinskas, “Assessing the Threat of 
Bioterrorism,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International 
Relations. US House of Representatives, October 20, 1999. (6) Joshua Lederberg (Ed.), Biological Weapons: 
Limiting the Threat, MIT Press; 1999. (7) Tara O’Toole and Thomas V. Ingelsby, “Facing the Biological Weapons 
Threat,” The Lancet, February 10,2001. 
Few open source studies adopt this approach. One notable exception is: Jean Pascal Zanders, “Assessing the Risk 3 
of Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation to Terrorists,” The Nonproliferation Review. 6(4), Fall 1999. 
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as to exhibit heightened infectivity, transmissibility, lethality, environmental hardiness, and/or result in a 
theoretical chimera agent. However, simply possessing a pathogen or toxin does not necessarily equate 
to possessing a biological weapon. Several steps are necessary to develop and deploy a biological 
weapon. They are: 
4 
1. acquiring a virulent pathogen or toxin 
2. producing material 
3. potentially processing the material 
a. to resist environmental stressors 
b. to survive dissemination 
c. 
4. employing an appropriate delivery form and device 
5. deploying the agent 
to increase the pathogens’ or toxins’ ability to invade a host organism (pathogenicity) 
These characteristics of a pathogen or toxin and the steps for successful deployment are discussed in 
greater detail in Section 3. 
1 .I .2 Bioterrorism 
While there is no single accepted definition of bioterrorism, for the purposes of this study we rely on a 
modified version of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition of terror i~m:~ 
Bioterrorism is the unlawful use of viruses, bacteria, fungi, toxins, or other pathogenic material against a 
government, the civilian population, livestock, crops, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, 
social, and/or economic objectives. 
1 .I .3 Biocrimes 
While all terrorist acts can be defined as criminal, not all criminal acts similar to terrorist acts are 
terrorism. For example, an individual might use a bomb either to injure or kill a spouse, or to destroy a 
target that he or she considers a representation of an enemy government, agency, or system. The former is 
a crime, the latter terrorism. Consequently, an act cannot be defined merely by the type of weapon used 
A chimera is an agent that has been combined with another agent to increase any of the above characteristics. TO 
date, no known biological weapons have been developed that are chimeras. In the future, however, advances in both 
microbiology and biotechnology make the possibility more likely. 
4 
Terrorism, as defined by the FBI, is “the unlawful use of force of violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives.” http: lw~~~~~ .acce~s .~po . j iov  nardcfr waisidx 03 28cfrO 03.html It is important to note, however, 
that even within the US government definitions are not uniform. For example, the Department of State uses Title 22 
of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) for its definition. That statute defines terrorism as the premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience (See Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001. 
~httd/www.state.govldocumentslor~anization/103 19.pdf). 
5 
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(conventional, radiological, chemical, or biological) but, rather, by the intent of the actor.6 For the 
purposes of this study, biocrimes will not be included in the analyses. 
1 .I .4 Diversion 
Diversion can encompass several types of events, including the unauthorized or illicit procurement of 
biological material, the unauthorized interception of biological material in transport, or the theft of 
biological material from an authorized repository. 
1 .I .5 High Consequence Pathogens and Toxins 
High Consequence Pathogens and Toxins (HCPT) are defined as pathogens and toxins, which are capable 
of severely affecting the US public health, safety, economy, and national security, or producing a high 
consequence event (defined in Section 1.1.6). The category includes pathogens and toxins that would 
most likely be targeted for diversion for use in bioterrorism or biological weapons proliferation. It is 
important to note that many pathogens that cause highly infectious disease would not necessarily be 
effective biological weapons. The US government’s interpretation of HCPTs is defined as a list of select 
 agent^.^ Additionally, a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Strategic Planning Workgroup 
met in 1999 to evaluate the public health consequences of some agents. They divided agents into three 
categories: A, B, and C agents; Category A agents were the highest concern from a public health 
perspective.’ 
1 .I .6 High Consequence Event 
A high consequence event is a concept that has been particularly difficult to define. It has been 
traditionally associated with injuries andor deaths of individuals (mass casualties). However, there are 
several factors that should be considered when deciding whether an event is high consequence. This study 
focuses on four elements: (1) Physical Damage, (2) Economic Impact, (3) Mass Casualties, and (4) Social 
Disintegration. 
Identifying intent of the individual(s) using a bioagent can be difficult. Without clear-cut evidence of intent (such 
as a confession or clear linkage to a group whose goals are well known) a certain amount of guesswork is involved. 
Wherever possible, multiple sources identifying intent are used; however, when multiple sources are not available, 
appropriate disclaimers will be provided. 
6 
Federal Register, Rules and Regulations, Vol 240, No. 67, 42 CFR Part 73 (Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of the Inspector General), December 13, 2002 p. 76895; Federal Register, Rules and Regulations, 
Vol240, No. 67,7 CFR Part 331,9 CFR Part 121 (Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service), December 13,2002, p. 76921. 
7 
“Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents,” Emerging Infectious Diseuses. 8(2) 8 
February 2002, p. 225-230. 
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1.1.6.1 Physical Damage 
One possible way to define a high consequence event is by the extent of physical damage incurred. This 
includes both damage to structures (e.g., contamination) as well as disruption of various components of 
infrastructure (e.g., communications, transportation, and food and water distribution systems). Physical 
damage, if sufficiently extreme, can cause the number of injuries and/or deaths to continue to increase 
well after the actual event takes place. 
1.1.6.2 Economic Impact 
The economic impact must also be considered when determining whether an event is high consequence. 
As with the impact of physical damage, the full economic impact may not be realized until some time 
after the event has occurred. For example, while the fall 200 1 anthrax attacks infected 22 individuals, and 
killed 5 ,  the economic impact has yet to be calculated in terms of building decontamination, medical 
costs, the sustained disruption of postal services, and decreased tourism. Economic impacts are also 
incurred when biological weapons are directed against animals (e.g., livestock) and plants (e.g., crops). 
1.1.6.3 Mass Casualties 
Mass casualties represent the most traditional conception of a high consequence event, referring to the 
actual number injured or dead. Currently, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defines a 
mass casualty event to include at least 1,000 injuries andor deaths.’ Under this definition alone, the fall 
200 1 US anthrax attacks would not be considered a high consequence event. 
1.1.6.4 Social Disintegration 
Social disintegration is the dissolution of the social contract made between citizens and their government. 
I t  represents the loss of trust by citizens in their government’s ability to protect them. It also indicates a 
breakdown in the social rules and norms of behavior. This is fundamentally different than the “social 
panic” hypothesis which predicts that in the event of a large-scale crisis, human behavior will devolve 
into more primitive “survival of the fittest” strategies. While either outcome is possible following a 
biological weapons attack, the response of citizens to both the September 11,2001 attacks and the fall 
200 1 anthrax attacks indicates that neither outcome has occurred. Of the four characteristics, social 
disintegration is the least predictable and most difficult to quantify. 
The metropolitan medical response systems under the Department of Health and Human Services use 1,000 
casualties (physical injuries or death) as a basis for their planning purposes. See US General Accounting Office, 
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, 
GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 7, September 1999. 
9 
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1.1.6.5 Summary 
The number of casualties is traditionally the most important characteristic that the US government (USG) 
considers when assessing the biological weapons threat. Because of this, the other three characteristics 
(physical damage, economic impact, and social disintegration) are often not given appropriate weight in 
determining high consequence events. Further complicating the matter is the fact that while mass 
casualties have been defined with a threshold of 1,000 injured and/or killed," no such threshold has been 
identified for either physical damage or economic impact. Finally, social disintegration is difficult to 
measure. While there may be characteristics that can be identified early in an attack (e.g., running from an 
attack site), long-term consequences to social order may not be readily identifiable andor may be more 
difficult to predict than the other characteristics. 
''Ibid. 
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2. History of Biological Weapons 
The historical record of biological weapons development and use is complicated by conflicting reports, 
often unsupported by secondary documentation. In addition, numerous factors impede verification of 
alleged biological weapons attacks. Finally, biological weapons may be introduced during naturally 
occurring disease outbreaks;’ ’ thus, failing perpetrator self-attribution, some incidents may never be 
discovered. Despite these drawbacks, there are fairly well documented incidents of biological weapons 
use, procurement, and possession. This section examines the incidents of biological weapons use at both 
the state and non-state level. An analysis follows, with an emphasis on how the agents have been acquired 
and what type of states, groups, and/or individuals have used these agents. 
2.1 State Programs 
The concept of using disease as a tool of warfare is not new. Prior to the development of modern 
warfare-where states applied new scientific developments to produce tanks, machine guns, and 
aircraft-victory depended largely on the number of men fighting on each side; wars were typically wars 
of attrition, and the ability to incapacitate soldiers or disrupt supply lines could produce the decisive 
numerical advantage necessary for victory.” Some of the earliest reports of biological weapons use 
reflect this need to incapacitate or kill enemy combatants. For example, in the Middle Ages, cadavers 
infected with plague were catapulted over city walls. Later, in the American colonial period, the British 
handed out smallpox-infected blankets to Native Americans. l 3  The dawning of the 20th Century brought 
the solidification of the nation-state and a new chapter in the history of biological weapons. States began 
to explore the role of biological weapons within the new realities of modern warfare. 
2.1.1 State Biological Weapons Use 1914-72 
2.1.1.1 World War! 
The First World War was a period of transition between the pre-modern and modern ages of warfare. The 
war saw cavalries but also trench warfare, the beginning of air and tank use, and multilateral involvement. 
Both France and Germany had active biological weapons programs during the war. 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin, and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A 
Historical Perspective,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 278(5), August 6, 1997. 
Mark Wheelis, “Biological Warfare Before 19 14,” Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and 
Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
12 
Jonathan B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001. 13 
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The German biological weapons program is best described as a sabotage program. Its aim was to 
undermine the enemy’s economic capacity to wage war. The program appears to have been independent 
of civilian oversight and was undertaken despite the General Staffs position that biological warfare was 
illegal. Notwithstanding, there was widespread agreement that anti-human pathogens should not be 
developed. Consequently, the German program considered only anti-animal and anti-crop 
pathogens; 
biological agent. Germany’s main targets were neutral nations that supplied the Allied Powers. The most 
extensive efforts were directed against the US (prior to its entry into World War I), although Argentina, 
Romania, Norway, and possibly Spain were also targeted.’ 7,’ * 
there is no evidence that Germany attempted to infect humans with any type of 14,15,16 
The German sabotage program relied on both German and non-German operatives, but appears to have 
been directed by diplomatic and consular corps officials within the target nations.” Pathogens used 
included glanders and anthrax. 20,21 Dissemination methods were crude and involved infecting food 
sources for animals, brushing bacteria on the noses of animals, and the direct “jabbing” of infected 
implements into animals to be shipped to Europe for use by the Allied Powers. The overall success of 
these efforts is difficult to assess. There were epidemics of glanders among livestock controlled by the 
The German anti-crop program appears to have involved chemical sabotage only. Consequently, it will not be 14 
discussed. 
I ‘ Erhard Geissler, “Biological Warfare Activities in Germany, 1923- 1945,” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Usefrom the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin, and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A I 0 
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2001). 
17 
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Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1989. 
l 9  Ibid. 
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Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. 
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Allied Powers in Europe; however, these attempts at sabotage-which may or may not have been caused 
by intentional German acts-did not result in German victory. 22,23 
The historical record suggests that French biological weapons program-like its German counterpart- 
was directed against crops and animals. As in the German program, glanders was used to infect livestock. 
However, some reports claim that the French used their prisoners of war in Germany as test subjects. 
According to such accounts, the French assembled parcels filled with various agents they would later use 
to infect livestock, and shipped them to the German prisoners. 24 
There is no other evidence of official state programs during World War I. Additionally, it is important to 
note that there is considerably more documentation confirming that Germany had a formal program than 
there is for France. 
2.1.1.2 The Inter War Years 
Despite Germany’s use of biological weapons during the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles- 
which specifically prohibited the use of chemical weapons-did not mention biological weapons. This 
oversight may have been the result of one or more factors, including: 1) the German program was one of 
sabotage only; 2) humans were specifically excluded as targets of the German program; or, 3) the drafters 
of the Treaty were unaware of the nature or extent of the German program. However, the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925, which entered into force in 1928, addressed the use of biological weapons; but it did not 
provide a comprehensive solution to the threat. This Protocol (The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare) 
prohibited the use of biological weapons during war, but did not outlaw continued research and 
development. In addition, the Protocol also allowed many nations to retain the right of retaliation, and 
lacked a means of enforcing compliance.26 Consequently, after WWI both Germany and France continued 
their biological weapons research and development, and many other nations began programs, including 
25 
22 Erhard Geissler. “Biological Warfare Activities in Germany, 1923- 1945.” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
23 Martin Hugh-Jones, “Wickham Steed and German Biological Warfare Research,” Intelligence and National 
Securi@. 7(4), 1992. 
Olivier Lepick, “French Activities Related to Biological Warfare, 19 19-1945.” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Usefrom the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
24 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin, and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A 25 
Historical Perspective,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 278(5), August 6, 1997. 
Erhard Geissler, Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, New York, NY,Oxford University Press Inc., 1986. 26 
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Canada, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.27 The US and Japan also began programs; however, neither 
nation ratified the Protocol during this time. 
Although many foreign powers assumed that Germany had an active and advanced biological weapons 
program during the inter war years, this was not the case. Although Germany did pursue rearmament, 
despite prohibitions following World War I, German biological weapons efforts were sporadic at best. 
Indeed, Germany’s offensive program may have been undertaken solely in response to suppositions that 
France and the USSR were interested in developing their own BW programs. The evidence suggests that 
Germany did not pursue formal biological weapons research during this period (formal research did not 
begin until after the outbreak of the Second World War, discussed in section 2.1.1.3), and some sources 
indicate that the inter war research that was conducted related to the potato 
As with the German biological weapons program during World War I, the documentation of the French 
program during the inter war years is sporadic. Much of the documentation was destroyed in 1940 to 
prevent it from falling into the hands of the Germans. Nonetheless, enough information remains to outline 
the post-World War I French program, which seems to have begun in 192 1. The impetus for the program 
was based on two convictions: first, a German biological weapons program existed and; second, Germany 
would never give up biological weapons research and development. As such, the French program was 
defensive in nature. Using information from the Trillat Report,3o the French concluded that the Germans 
had intended to spread infectious disease along the front lines during World War I and that this research 
had continued. Additionally, the report asserted that biological weapons had specific-and desirable- 
military characteristics including delayed effects and the ability to infect only a small area; the disease 
would then spread through human andor animal contact or through the air andor water. The report 
identified specific defensive mechanisms, including vaccination, gas masks, and release of antiseptic 
 cloud^.^' 
In the early 1920s, France began to conduct experiments that examined whether pathogens could be 
effectively delivered by explosive devices. Animal experiments during this time used Salmonella typhi, 
Streptococcus pneumoniae, Vibreo cholerae, and Micrococcus prodigious. However, the program stalled 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin, and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A 27 
Historical Perspective,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 278(5), August 6,  1997. 
Erhard Geissler, “Biological Warfare Activities in Germany, 1923-1 945.” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
29 Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents,” 
Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. 
Andre Trillat, Trillat Report, Director of Laboratoire annexe des etudes chimiques de la Marine (Naval Chemical 30 
Research Laboratory). 
31 Olivier Lepick, “French Activities Related to Biological Warfare, 19 19-1945,” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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between 1927 and 1934. The reason for this absence of research is not clear; it may be that France 
intended to abide by the prohibitions of the Geneva Protocol and/or was limited by financial constraints. 
But when Germany withdrew from that Protocol and tensions began to increase across Europe, France 
restarted its biological weapons program and began a cooperative Anglo-French program. Throughout the 
period, France’s overall biological weapons policy appears to have been one of defense. 32 
Japan’s biological weapons program began at the end of World War I with the creation of Unit 73 1. This 
unit began to conduct experiments on a variety of agents including anthrax, Shigella spp., Vibreo 
cholerae, Salmonella spp., and Yevsinia pestis.33 Because it conducted human experiments, Japan’s 
program was fbndamentally different than other programs of the period. Initially, Japan used prisoners for 
testing. 
afflicted with endemic outbreaks of diseases such as pneumonic plague and cholera. Consequently, the 
Japanese biological weapons program could be tested while “hiding” amidst naturally occurring diseases. 
Interestingly, Japan’s conquest of Manchukuo led to a League of Nations’ investigation under the Lytton 
Commission in 193 1 that itself became victim to an alleged attempt by Japan to infect members of the 
commission with cholera. There were no reported illnesses.35 Throughout the period, Japan’s program 
also included defensive research designed to counter suspected biological weapons development by the 
USSR and China.36 
34 The experiments were carried out in Manchukuo (Manchuria), a region in China commonly 
In contrast to other nations, Japan did not hesitate to use biological weapons. This may be due, in part, to 
the fact that Japan was not a party to the Geneva Protocol and therefore not bound by the prohibition on 
wartime biological weapons use. Another possible reason for Japan’s use of biological weapons is more 
pragmatic: the Japanese believed that they would gain a strategic advantage over their adversaries by 
developing and acquiring the ability to deploy biological weapons. 
32 Ibid. 
Sheldon H. Harris,” Japanese Biological Warfare Research on Humans: A Case Study of Microbiology and 
Ethics,” The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Raymond 
A. Zelinskas (Ed.), New York, New York Academy of Sciences, 1992. 
33 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrzbing Reality of Biological Warfare, New York, NY: St. 34 
Martin’s Press 1999. 
34 Ibid. 
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, Center for 
Counterproliferation Resesarch, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
35 
2001). 
36 Sheldon Harris, “The Japanese Biological Warfare Programme: An Overview.” Biological and Toxin Weapons: 
Research, Development and Usefvom the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon 
(Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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Indeed, Japan used biological weapons extensively during World War I1 (discussed in Section 2.1.1.3). 37 
The number of casualties of Japan’s program during the inter war years is estimated to be at least 
10,000.38,39 In the past, Japan had denied both developing a biological weapons program and deploying 
biological weapons against humans. However, in a 2002 court ruling concerning reparations for Chinese 
victims of these attacks, Japan admitted using biological weapons both before and after World War I1 
against Chinese citizens4dling perhaps  thousand^.^' 
The defeat of Imperial Russia in World War I, particularly the thousands of casualties suffered on the 
Eastern front, influenced the initial development of the Soviet military. Determined to not endure such a 
defeat again, the Soviet Union began to create a modern military with all manner of armaments at its 
disposal. While the impetus was originally to develop chemical weapons, it quickly evolved to include the 
biological weapons as well. However, it remains unclear what priority biological weapons research and 
development had in the larger military modernization eff01-t.~’ During this period, the Soviets voiced 
reservations to the Geneva Protocol, maintaining that the USSR would only be bound by the Geneva 
Protocol in relation to other states that abided by it. Essentially, the Russians reserved the right to violate 
the Protocol under two conditions. The Russians reserved the right to use biological weapons during 
wartime, against (1) any state not party to the Protocol and (2) any state in violation of the Protocol. 
These reservations responded to two fimdamental weakness of the Protocol-the fact that it did not bind 
all states and the fact that it lacked a means of enforcement. 
Although Russia suffered thousands of deaths at the hands of the Germans during World War I, USSR 
and Germany initially entered into a cooperative research agreement on chemical agents. However, 
Germany terminated this agreement in 1933, leaving the USSR with no reliable intelligence on German 
weapons proliferation. Subsequently, the USSR began to believe that Germany was developing a 
biological weapons program. The Soviets were equally suspicious about British biological weapons 
development. These fears spurred on the development of the Soviet program. 
The Soviet BW program evolved under military control and direction. After conducting experiments with 
anthrax and botulinum toxin, the military argued that biological weapons were feasible. Similar to the 
Ibid. 
38 Japanese prison camps of this time were particularly brutal. Therefore, it should be noted that this estimate does 
not appear to separate the effects of biological weapons experimentation from the environmental effects of 
imprisonment. 
Sheldon H. Harris, “Japanese Biological Warfare Research on Humans: A Case Study of Microbiology and 
Ethics,” The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Raymond 
A. Zelinskas (Ed.), New York, New York Academy of Sciences, 1992. 
39 
40Jonathan Watts, “Belatedly, Japan Admits Use of Germ Warfare.” The Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2002 
htto:/ ~~ww.csrnonitor.com/2002 OX28h07sOl -woai~.html 
Valentin Bojtzov and Erhard Geissler. 1999. “Military Biology in the USSR, 1920-1945.” In, Biological and 
Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945. Erhard Geissler and John Ellis 
van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press. 
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authors of the Trillat Report in France, Soviet policy-makers concluded that bombs could effectively 
deliver pathogens to enemy territory. As a result, the USSR decided to expand the scope of research to 
include both offensive and defensive elements. The Soviets pursued the investigation of vaccines, 
decontamination methods, and protective clothing as BW countermeasures. Early offensive research 
focused on a variety of pathogens, including Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium botulinum, Yersinia pestis, 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Field tests, including open-air dissemination of selected agents, were 
conducted on animals at numerous sites in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Eventually, Vozrozhdeniya Island 
became a primary biological weapons testing ground. 42 
During this inter war period, the Soviet biological weapons program suffered several set backs including 
poor training among its scientists, a civilian population that was already suffering from frequent outbreaks 
of endemic disease, and the Politburo’s purges in which scientists and military officers were frequently 
targeted.43 However, the Soviet program, while not particularly advanced during the inter war period, 
would eventually evolve into the most comprehensive biological weapons program in the world. 
The British biological weapons program began as a defensive program in 1936. It evolved into an 
offensive and defensive program in the 1940s and 1950s, and returned to a defensive program in the 
1950s. Although the Geneva Protocol had been ratified by the United Kingdom (UK), the British reserved 
the right to violate the Protocol under two conditions. Just as the Russians had done, the British reserved 
the right to use biological weapons during wartime, against (1) any state not party to the Protocol and (2) 
any state in violation of the Protocol.44 
Britain’s rationale for developing biological weapons-as was often the case in this period-rested partly 
on concerns that other nations-most notably, Germany and the USSR-had biological weapons 
programs. During the inter war years, the British program+entered at Porton Down-focused 
primarily on countermeasures to be employed against biological weapons, including vaccines and various 
remedies for both human and animal targets.46 The British program continued to evolve and advance 
during World War I1 (discussed in section 2.1.1 .3).47 
45 
42 Ibid. 
V. N. Soyfer, Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1994. 43 
Gradon B. Carter, Chemical and Biological Defence at Porton Down, London, The Stationary Office, 2000. 44 
Gordon Carter and Brian Balmer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945-1990. Cold War, Hot 45 
Science. Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (Eds.), Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999. 
46 Gradon B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “British Biological Warfare and Biological Defence, 1925-45.” 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Usefrom the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Peter Hammond and Gradon Carter, From Biological Warfare to Healthcare: Porton Down 1940-2000. Great 41 
Britain: Antony Rowe, Ltd., 2002. 
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Canada’s biological weapons program was largely directed towards assisting the American and British 
programs. Similar to many other nations, Canada had become increasingly concerned that such programs 
were being developed by other nations-particularly Germany and Italy. The Canadian biological 
weapons program, which was closely linked to its chemical weapons program, did not reach its apex until 
World War I1 (discussed in section 2.1.1 .3).48 
The US-like Japan-was not a party to the Geneva Protocol.49 As early as 1926, the Chief of the US 
Chemical Warfare Service concluded that there was no effective method for the use of “germs” in 
warfare. This belief was strengthened by a 1933 Army Medical Corps article, which claimed successhl 
dissemination of a BW agent would prove extremely difficult. The US opinion began to change in 1939, 
when a Japanese Army doctor attempted unsuccessfully to secure a strain of yellow fever from the 
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. Soon, the US had other reasons for concern. Between 1940 
and 194 1, scattered reports that Japan was using biological weapons in its war with China began to 
circulate. Additionally, in 194 1 Swiss reports claimed that Germany was hiding experiments with 
botulinum toxin in Paris. Although some US officials were still skeptical about the need for a biological 
weapons program, by 1942 the War Bureau of Consultants concluded that warfare using biological 
weapons was feasible and posed a threat to US national security. Full program development took place 
during the Second World War (discussed in section 2.1.1 .3).50 
2.1.1.3 World WarII -  1972 
The biological weapons programs of the inter-war period continued throughout World War 11. Among 
German intelligence had evaluated the Canadian, British, US, and Soviet programs, and were able to gain 
information on dissemination techniques after the fall of France in 1940. In addition, several Soviet 
deserters provided Germany with information about the Soviet program, leading Germany to conclude 
that the USSR had an advanced program that encompassed as many as eight facilities and test sites. 
Germany also believed that the USSR was experimenting with a number of agents, including those that 
cause anthrax, glanders, and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Similarly, Germany determined that the UK 
was working with anthrax, dysentery, glanders, and plague. German intelligence reports had also reached 
similar conclusions about Canadian research. Finally, Germany gained information about the US program 
in Edgewood Arsenal (Maryland) and Pine Bluff (Arkansas), indicating that anthrax and FMD, among 
others, were being studied and tested. 
48 Donald Avery, “Canadian Biological and Toxin Warfare, Research, Development and Planning, 1925-1945, 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
49 Although the US signed the Geneva Protocol, the Senate did not ratify it at that time, and the Protocol was 
subsequently withdrawn from further consideration. The Protocol was not submitted for ratification until 1969 when 
President Nixon submitted it to the US Senate. 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “US Biological Warfare Planning and Preparedness: The Dilemmas of Policy.” 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945. Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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Despite these numerous intelligence reports, Hitler reaffirmed his opposition to biological warfare- even 
as a tool of retaliati~n.~’ Instead, Hitler directed research towards defensive measures in the event of a 
BW attack by an Allied Power. The Nazis performed experiments on prisoners in their concentration 
camps. Prisoners were infected with Rickettsia prowazekii, Rickettsia rnooseri, the Hepatitis A virus, and 
Plasmodia spp. Experiments were done primarily to aid in the development of preventive vaccines, and 
consequently, German officials believed that their biological weapons program was entirely defensive in 
nature.52 While the possibility of offensive research cannot be excluded, ultimately Germany remained 
compliant with the prohibition of biological weapons use during war as stated in the Geneva Protocol. 53 
The Japanese biological weapons program also advanced during the Second World War. Japan had 
already conducted experiments on human targets prior to the outbreak of war. Japan continued these 
experiments and, in 1939, extended them to wartime  target^.^^'^^ Because these experiments occurred 
both before and during World War 11, actual casualties during wartime are difficult to estimate; however, 
Japan has admitted to casualties numbering in the thousands.56 Japan employed a variety of techniques to 
spread biological weapons agents including allowing fleas to feast on plague-infected rats prior to 
releasing them from aircraft over Chinese cities.57 The allied occupation of Japan ended the state 
biological weapons program in that country. 
The Soviet biological weapons program started as early as 1928. Control of the program transferred to the 
OGPU5* (the state political police and precursor to the KGB59) in 1933, and the program continued 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A 51 
Historical Perspective.” The Journal of the American Medical Associatio,. 278(5)., August 6 ,  1997 
52 Ibid. 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler 53 
and John Ellis van Courtland’Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrihing Reality of Biological Warfare, New York, NY: St. 54 
Martin’s Press, 1999. 
Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents,” 55 
Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. 
Jonathan Watts, “Belatedly, Japan Admits Use of Germ Warfare,” The Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2002. 56 
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57 Sheldon H. Harris, “Japanese Biological Warfare Research on Humans: A Case Study of Microbiology and 
Ethics,” The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Raymond 
A. Zelinskas (Ed.), New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992. 
580b”edinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie (OGPU) or Unified State Political Directorate 
59 Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (KGB) or Committee of State Security 
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throughout World War 11. Following the 1941 publication of an article in Informatsionni Sbornick (a 
semi-official government bulletin) detailing biological weapons work in other nations, Soviet officials 
became alarmed at their nation’s general lack of preparedness against a biological weapons attack. Five 
months later, German forces mounted an invasion of the USSR. Some scholars have suggested that part of 
the acceleration of the Soviet program included experiments on prisoners near Ulan Bator (Mongolia), in 
the prisons of Leningrad, in the White Sea off Kola Peninsula, and on one of the Solovki Islands. These 
human experiments may have been the cause of a plague epidemic in Mongolia resulting in 3,000 to 
5,000 deaths following the escape of a prisoner who had been experimented on.6o However the priority 
placed on biological weapons development within the larger context of military operations is unknown. 
Of particular interest is an allegation that the Soviet army used biological weapons against the German 
army in 1942. That year, the Soviet BW program relocated to Kirov (560 miles NW of Moscow) to 
escape advancing German troops. During the 1942 battle of Stalingrad, tularemia infected German army 
troops in southern Russia. That outbreak eventually crossed battle lines and befell Soviet troops as well. 
In addition, in 1943 an outbreak of Q fever was reported in the Crimea. Significantly, both diseases were 
under research by the Soviets for possible biological weapons application. While suspicious, these 
incidents have not been confirmed as biological weapons use.61 
The American, British, and Canadian biological weapons programs cooperated closely with one another 
during the second World War.62 The American program started in earnest approximately seven months 
after the attack against Pearl Harbor in 1942. The program was under the direction of the War Reserve 
Service and included a research and development facility at Fort Detrick, MD-then known as Camp 
Detrick-and testing facilities in Mississippi and Utah. The program also included a production facility in 
Terre Haute, Indiana.63 The existence of the US biological weapons program was not public knowledge 
and came about partially because the standard prohibitions against biological warfare were believed to be 
no longer applicable based on the evolution of World War 11. Additionally, American policy makers 
believed that the Axis Powers were capable of ruthless implementation of their wartime objectives, a 
sobering conclusion, given numerous intelligence reports indicating their biological weapons capabilities 
were far more advanced than previously believed. 
As a result, the US began a defensive biological weapons program that soon turned to offensive research. 
The program culminated with the development of what officials considered the most promising biological 
weapons: anti-plant agents. Research focused on developing these agents for use against isolated Japanese 
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garrisons, which relied on their own gardens for food. Additional planning was also undertaken to 
investigate anti-crop agents for use against the Japanese mainland. These agents were considered ideal: 
they attacked a multitude of plants at all levels of development and were not vulnerable to climatic 
conditions. In addition, they produced no adverse effects on humans. 64 However, the American program 
did not limit itself to anti-plant agents. The US also conducted research on Bacillus anthracis, and 
Brucella suis, among others. 65 
After WWII, the production facility in Indiana was closed. However, the US opened a new facility in Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas, reflecting the expansion of the program during the Korean War (1950-1953). It was at 
this time that the US’s technological advances allowed for large-scale fermentation and weaponization of 
pathogens and toxins. In addition, the US also conducted research to develop medical countermeasures to 
protect US troops from a BW attack.66 
During the 1960s, the US program expanded its arsenal of biological weapons to include anthrax, 
botulinum toxin, tularemia, brucellosis, Q Fever, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis, Rice Blast, Rye Stem Rust, and Wheat Stem The US offensive program was 
officially terminated by President Nixon in 1969 in anticipation of the US’s entry into compliance with 
the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention. The US also adopted a “No First Use” policy in relation 
to biological weapons. 68 
The British biological weapons program concentrated on anthrax and botulinum toxin.69 The work on 
anthrax involved various dissemination techniques, including possible aerosolization. In 1942, British 
researchers from Porton Down converged on Scotland’s Gminard Island to conduct tests on the feasibility 
of anthrax dissemination from traditional bombs. The experiments-conducted on sheep--confirmed the 
feasibility of using anthrax from high-flying bombings. The UK also developed “cattle cakes” with 
anthrax as part of an anti-livestock program. These cakes contained Bacillus anthracis spores nestled 
between various crop products used in livestock feed. However, the UK policy dictated that the cakes be 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “US Biological Warfare Planning and Preparedness: The Dilemmas of Policy,” 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
h l  
(’’ George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin and Edward M. Eitzen Jr. “Biological Warfare: A 
Historical Perspective,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 278(5), August 6 ,  1997. 
(’(’ Ibid. 
US Department of the Army, US Army Activity in the US Biological Warfare Programs, Washington, DC: US 6 7 
Department of the Army, February 24, 1977. 
George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin and Edward M. Eitzen Jr., “Biological Warfare: A 68 
Historical Perspective,” The Journal of the American Medical Association, 278(5), August 6 ,  1997. 
Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer, “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945-1990,” Cold War, Hot 69 
Sciene, Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (Eds.), Amsterdam: Hanvood Academic Publishers, 1999. 
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deployed only in retaliation against a German biological weapons attack. In the end, all but a few of the 
approximately five million cattle cakes were destroyed after World War II.70,7’ Ultimately, despite the 
extensive testing, Britain never deployed biological weapons against the Axis Powers. 
After the second World War, the UK expanded its biological weapon research to include other agents 
such as tularemia, brucellosis, plague, and Venezuelan equine encephalitis. These agents were tested at 
sea using a variety of dissemination devices. The tests ended in 1955 and, in 1958, the Chiefs of Staff 
stated that neither biological nor chemical weapons had strategic value. By this time, the UK had 
informed its partners, Canada and the US, that the UK would only engage in defensive BW research. 72 
The Canadian biological weapons research facilities were developed at Goss Isle and Suffield during the 
war. Initially, Canadian officials feared the consequences of possible sabotage against its population. Of 
particular concern was the impact of an outbreak of either bubonic plague or Rinderpest. Canada began its 
collaboration with the US by sharing its extensive work on Aegis aegypti, a species of mosquito that is the 
vector for both yellow fever and malaria. In return, Canada was given access to US work on botulinum 
toxin, malaria, plague, typhus, and others. In 1941, Canadian, American, and British scientists met in 
Ottawa to discuss the nature of the biological weapons threat and, more specifically, which pathogens 
were most likely to be used by Germany and Japan. Formal cooperation between the three nations began 
in 1942, including collaboration with Britain’s anthrax program. Additionally, an initiative to develop a 
Rinderpest vaccine was started. The Canadian-US research collaboration expanded in plague, brucellosis, 
and botulinum toxin, emphasizing the use of flies as vectors. Continued collaboration resulted in the 
development of an especially lethal strain of botulinum toxin. Despite their coordinated efforts, the US, 
UK, and Canada theoretically could only deploy anthrax as a weapon by the end of the war. Canada 
continued its partnership with the US and UK after World War I1 and through the early years of the Cold 
The end of World War I1 did not result in a new international treaty prohibiting the use of biological 
weapons. Instead, the Geneva Protocol was viewed as the continuing binding agreement among states 
parties. Consequently, many of the nations engaged in research during the war continued while other 
70 Gradon B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “British Biological Warfare and Biological Defence, 1925-45,” 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945. Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
”Richard J. Manchee, Malcolm G. Broster, Anthoy J. Stagg, and Stephen E. Hibbs, “Formaldehyde Solution 
Effectively Inactivates Spores of Bacillus anthracis on the Scottish Island of Gruinard,” Applied and Environmental 
Microbiology, 60(1 l), 1994. 
Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer. “Chemical and Biological Warfare and Defence, 1945-1990.” Cold War, Hot 72 
Science, Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (Eds.), Amsterdam: Hanvood Academic Publishers, 1999. 
73 Donald Avery “Canadian Biological and Toxin Warfare Research, Development and Planning, 1925-45,” In, 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Erhard Geissler and 
John Ellis van Courtland Moon (Eds), Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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nations initiated BW research. For instance, Israel began in 1948 to court scientists who could either kill 
or cure the masses. 14 
2.1.1.4 The Biological and Toxins Weapons convention 
Following the destructive use of chemical weapons on the battlefields of WWI, the international 
community took a major step forward in discouraging deployment of biological and chemical weapons by 
signing the Geneva Protocol f o r  the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Although the Geneva Protocol bans state use of 
chemical and biological weapons during times of war, it does not address the use of biological weapons in 
internal or civil conflicts. Further, the Geneva Protocol places no restrictions on the production, 
stockpiling, research, or testing of either chemical or biological weapons. The recognized limitations of 
the Geneva Protocol led to the drafting of the more comprehensive Convention of the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, otherwise known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
The BWC opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975 after 19 countries, along with the 
three depository nations - the US, UK, and USSR - ratified the text and provisions. Currently, 146 
countries are party to the treaty. These Member States meet for Review Conferences every five years to 
discuss strategies to strengthen the treaty. 
The BWC was the first multilateral treaty to ban the production, stockpiling, acquisition, and effective use 
of an entire class of weapons. The BWC also prohibits Member States from transferring biological 
weapons (either directly or indirectly) or assisting or encouraging any state, group of states, or 
international organization, to fabricate or expand biological weapons program activities. The Convention 
requires States Parties with existing biological weapons programs to divert all illicit program activities 
towards legitimate purposes within nine months of their accession to the treaty. 
Fulfilling the prohibitions of the Convention has proved to be exceedingly difficult due in large part to the 
BWC (1) lacking universality and (2) not including effective verification or enforcement mechanisms to 
guarantee compliance with the treaty  provision^.^^ 
2.1.2 
Although many nations signed and ratified the BWC, officially discontinued all offensive biological 
weapons research and development, and declared any existing programs dismantled, biological weapons 
proliferation continued. Though the US stopped all offensive biological weapons work in 1969 and 
entered into the BWC in good faith, not all states were so inclined. Some states did not sign the BWC. 
State BW Programs and Use After 1972 
74 Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents,” 
Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. 
Reynolds M. Salerno and Daniel P. Estes, “National Legislative Measures to Prevent the Proliferation of 75 
Biological Weapons.” Prepared for: National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation Policy 
(NA-241) U.S. Department of Energy (Sand No. 2003 - 4285), September 2003. 
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Others became signatories, yet retained prohibited programs. The Soviet Union maintained the most 
extensive of these illegal, clandestine programs. 
After signing and ratifying the BWC, the USSR accelerated its offensive biological weapons program, 
which is believed to be the world’s most c ~ m p r e h e n s i v e . ~ ~ ’ ~ ~  Although a signatory to the BWC, the 
Soviet Union continued research, development, and production of weaponized agents. The publication of 
Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World- 
Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It in 1999 by Ken Alibek, a top official in the Soviet biological 
weapons program and defector to the US, confirmed that the Russians researched and weaponized a wide 
array of pathogens. Biohazard, as well as USG debriefings with Alibek himself, are cited as primary 
sources of information in the Office of the US Secretary of Defense’s Proliferation: Threat and 
Response, released in January 200 1 .78,79 
The Soviet biological weapons program was extensive, comprising a range of institutions under different 
ministries and approximately 50 ostensibly commercial facilities that were collectively known as 
Biopreparat. In addition, the Ministries of Agriculture and Public Health, as well as the KGB, the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences and the chemical industry were part of the program. At least four of these biological 
weapons institutes were under former Soviet military control and, to date, the US has not received access 
to these four institutes. An estimated 15,000 senior weapons scientists were involved in the 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, new nations such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, program. 
and Uzbekistan inherited an infrastructure capable of producing biological weapons. 
80,8 1,82 
C. J. Davis, “Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union 76 
and Iraq,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5, 1999. 
Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, “Former Soviet Biological Weapons 
Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1999. 
77 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, US Department of Defense, January 7x 
200 1. http://www.defenselink.mil. 
Sergei Popov, a former top scientist in the Soviet biological weapons program, who defected in 1992 (see 
http:lluww.Dbs.org wabhJnova bioterror biow ao~ov.htrnl), and the memoirs of Igor Domaradsky have confirmed 
many of Alibek‘s claims. 
70 
“Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks,” Report to 
Congressional Requesters: US General Accounting Office, April 2000. 
8’ Amy E. Smithson, “Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Complexes,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 32, 1999. 
“Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks,” Report to 52 
Congressional Requesters: US General Accounting Office, April 2000. 
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The Soviet biological weapons program was not publicly confirmed until 1992-after the collapse of the 
USSR. Officials in the West had long suspected its existence, especially following an accidental release 
of weaponized anthrax from a Russian production facility. In April 1979, a biological weapons facility in 
Sverdlovsk, now Yekatarinburg, accidentally released 100 grams of highly processed, aerosolized 
Bacillus anthracis spores. The official explanation of the illnesses caused by the incident was that the 
infected individuals had consumed “tainted meat.” While the exact number of fatalities resulting from this 
incident may never be known, the official death toll was 64; others argue that it may be as high as 
105.83,84,85 
State funding for biological research facilities and programs in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has been 
reduced considerably since the end of the Soviet period, adding a new threat: highly capable scientists and 
engineers opting to leave their homelands to exchange their skills for more lucrative funding elsewhere. 
By 1995, approximately 300 scientists and engineers had immigrated to the US and Europe; however, 
there are no reliable numbers available on how many have immigrated to sensitive nations.86 Finally, the 
possibility of the sale of both equipment and biological weapons materials, such as seed stock cultures, to 
other nations makes the FSU an on-going biological weapons proliferation threat.87 
The US has recently begun to dismantle some of the biological facilities in the FSU and improve the 
security at In 1994, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), with offices 
throughout the FSU, began issuing grants to bioweaponeers. These grants were seen as an opportunity to 
provide needed funding to cash-strapped FSU scientists, to encourage FSU scientists to move towards 
peaceful research, to smooth the transition to a market economy, to persuade FSU scientists to work 
within a broader, global scientific community, and to help solve national and international technical 
problems. In addition to ISTC, many agencies in the US and various European governments, many 
Kenneth Alibek, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the 83 
World-Toldfrom Inside by the Man Who Ran It, New York, NY: Random House, 1999. 
84 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with Dr. Kenneth Alibek,” 
The Nonproliferation Review, SpringISurnmer 1999. 
85 Jean Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Pathogen, Berkley, 2001. 
As defined by the Department of Energy due to concerns about their activities which affect U.S. national security 
interests, including but not limited to nuclear proliferation, regional instability, and/or support for terrorism. The list 
(as of April 2003) includes: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, 
Cuba, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Korea, North (Democratic People’s Republic), Kyrgyzstan, 
Libya, Moldova, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
86 
Amy E. Smithson, “Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological 87 
Weapons Complexes,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 32, 1999. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, US Department of Defense, January 88 
200 1. http://www.defenselink.mil. 
GAO, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report for FY 2004,” GAO-03-1 OOXR, 2003. 89 
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independent foundations, and the European Union fund programs and activities, such as the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program, aimed at preventing the dissemination of equipment, personnel, and 
information from the FSU to sensitive nations.90391 One such CTR effort initiated in the late 1990s, the 
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program targeted biosecurity and biosafety enhancements, 
collaborative research, and facilities and equipment di~mantlement.~~ 
Iraq also chose to ignore the BWC prohibitions. Prior to the Gulf War in 1991, US military intelligence 
confirmed that Iraq-a signatory to the BWC-was developing both Bacillus anthracis and botulinum 
toxin for use in biological weapons. Iraq’s program is believed to have begun in either the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ~ ~ ~  or 
the early 1 9 8 0 ~ . ~ ~  The Iraqi program worked with cholera, plague, Salmonella spp., ricin, aflatoxins, 
haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, staphylococcal enterotoxins, and camel Because this work 
continued when Iraq was engaged in a war with Iran, the US failed to understand the implications of Iraqi 
purchases of test animals from Western nations and strains of diseases from the American Type Culture 
Collection (ATCC). By the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Saddam Hussein had ordered an 
acceleration of Iraq’s biological weapons program, including the loading of weaponized biological agents 
onto missiles. Many experts suggest that the chief reason these missiles were not deployed in the 1991 
Gulf War was President Bush’s threat of nuclear retaliation in the event of biological attack. 96,97,98,99 
”Ibid. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, US Department of Defense, January 91 
200 1. http://www.defenselink.mil. 
92 Amy Woolf and Michelle Stem Cook, “Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: US Assistance 
to the Former Soviet States,” CRS Report for Congress: CRS-11, April 10,2002. 
93 Milton Leitenberg, “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or Biological Agents,” 
Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, September 2000. 
94 C. J. Davis, “Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of the Former Soviet Union 
and Iraq,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5 , .  1999. 
951bid. 
96 US State Department, “Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” White Paper, February 13, 1998. 
httD :I/\+ ww . state. go v wikl.v/rerions/iieairacl whit e pat~cr.htni1. 
Gregory Koblenz, “Countering Dual-Use Facilities: Lessons from Iraq and Sudan,” Jane ’s Intelligence Review, 97 
March 1, 1999. 
98 Barry Kellman, “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,” Haward Journal of Law & 
Public Policy, 24(2), Spring 2001. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrzhing Reality of Biological Warfare, New York, NY:  St. 99 
Martin’s Press, 1999. 
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The Iraqi biological weapons program provoked concern internationally and resulted in a series of UN 
sponsored inspections. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) was formed in 1991 to provide on-site 
inspection teams to verify the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all Iraqi WMD, including 
ballistic missiles with range greater than 150 kilometers, as well as any related production facilities and 
equipment. UN Security Council Resolution 687 that created UNSCOM also called for continued 
monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance and required Iraq to declare the location, amounts, and 
types of all such items that fell under UNSCOM’s authorization. Initially, Iraq provided a declaration of 
all their WMD, but claimed not to have a biological weapons program.”’ Throughout the 1990s, Iraq 
continually delayed and prevented inspectors from gaining access to inspection sites, despite a series of 
UN Security Council resolutions. As a result of these obstacles, the UNSCOM staff completely withdrew 
from Iraq by December 1998. In December 1999, the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) replaced UNSCOM.’01”02 However, UNMOVIC met the same resistance, and 
the Commission was unable to make a single inspection until late November 2002. Iraq granted the 
inspectors access only after considerable pressure from the international community. In October 2002, the 
US Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the use of unilateral force against Iraq. The following 
month the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which called for immediate and complete 
disarmament, demanded full compliance with inspections, and warned that Iraq faced serious 
consequences as a result of continued vi~lations.’’~ Only after this pressure, in late November 2002, was 
UNMOVIC finally able to begin the inspection process. However, the inspections failed to uncover 
WMD, and Iraq continued to deny their existence in an official declaration to the UN, one which both the 
US and UN considered unsatisfactory. The inspection teams remained in Iraq until late March 2003, when 
Iraq rejected the Bush administration’s ultimatum that Saddam flee or face a US invasion. Following the 
war in Iraq, coalition forces have as yet been unable to find biological weapons and have established no 
conclusive evidence of a post-1 99 1 Iraqi program. 
In addition to the FSU and. Iraq, several other states have either self-identified or are suspected of 
developing a BW program. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the dual-use aspect of 
pathogens makes determining which states are developing a biological weapons program and which are 
not extremely difficult. For example, Iran continues to acquire dual-use biotechnology equipment under 
the pretext of civilian use (e.g., vaccine development), but is believed to have initiated a biological 
program during the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, officials from both DoD and State have reported that 
Iran, among other nations, has been attempting to acquire biological weapons expertise and materials 
“‘United Nations, “UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events,” December 1999. httn:/ wwt% .more Dcpts 
u n ~ ~ m  Chronologvi chronol o.ev.11 tin. 
“‘Ibid. 
United Nations, “New UN Monitoring Commission for Iraq,” UN Press Release SC/6775, December 17, 1999. 102 
http: lwww.un.oi-g Deace 19001 2 17.sc6775.doc.html. 
US Department of State, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” September 2002. 103 
h t t ~ : /  www ~tatc.g!o\iiln nea 1345O.htm 
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from the FSU.lo4 Evidence suggests that Iran has a limited offensive program and may be working to 
expand its biological weapons Capabilities. 105 
Other states suspected of biological weapons development or interest in developing biological weapons 
programs as identified by the US government, include: lo6, 
China - The Chinese program is believed to have been started in the 1950s with some 
indications that biological weapons research is being conducted at two civilian research 
facilities that are under de-facto military control. Although China became a state party to the 
BWC in 1984, China’s CBM-mandated declarations have not resolved US concerns, and the 
US believes strong indications exist that China maintains its offensive program. 
Syria - The Syrian program is identified primarily as a state of proliferation concern. Syria 
has a biotechnological infrastructure and is suspected of pursuing an offensive program.’07 
Syria is a signatory to the BWC. 
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Libya - The Libyian biological weapons program is believed to be at the research and 
development stage.”* Libya is neither a state party nor a signatory to the BWC. In December 
2003, Libya pledged to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction, including biological, 
programs. 109 
India - The Indian program is believed to include civilian facilities that conduct limited 
biological weapons defensive work. India is a state party to the BWC. 
Pakistan - The Pakistani program has limited biological weapons research capabilities, but is 
seeking foreign technology and equipment to create a biotechnology infrastructure. Pakistan 
is a state party to the BWC. 
“Biological Weapons: Efforts to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks,” Report to 
Congressional Requesters: US General Accounting Office, April 2000. 
lo5 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 
Agreements, Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, US Department of Defense, January 106 
2001. http:/!~l;~~rh’.dc.fcnselink.mil . 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 107 
Agreements, Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998. 
lo* Ibid. 
George W. Bush, “Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs,” Washington, D.C., December 19, 2003. 109 
http-I www.state.gov/p, nca r k  rm 37459.htm 
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North Korea - The North Korean program is suspected of being large-scale and operational 
since the 1960~”~’”’  North Korea is a state party to the BWC. 
In addition, South Africa had a fully developed biological weapons program, which was eliminated after 
the collapse of apartheid. In contrast to the programs discussed above, the South African program was 
designed primarily for assassination of anti-apartheid activists. There is limited information that indicates 
South Africa may also have used Bacillus anthracis during the Rhodesian (formally Zimbabwe) war of 
independence.”2 This information remains unverified. The director of the South African biological 
weapons program, Wouter Basson, was put on trial facing 46 charges, including sixteen counts of murder 
and thirteen counts of conspiracy to murder using biological weapons; however, he was acquitted of all 
charges in April 2002. 11331143115 South Africa is now a state party to the BWC, but questions over South 
African BW still remain. According to The Washington Post, it is still unknown if the biological 
weapons that South Africa possessed were destroyed, and, if not, where these weapons are currently 
housed.’’6 
Bulgaria was also believed to have had a biological weapons program intended primarily for 
assassination. In 1978, Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov was killed in England after being injected 
with a tiny metallic sphere that contained ricin. An additional attack in 1978 against dissident Vladimir 
Kostov, also involved ricin; however, Mr. Kostov did not die from that attack.’I7 Bulgaria is currently a 
state party to the BWC. 
William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grave New World,” The Washington Post, July 26, 1999. 110 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 111 
Agreements, Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrzjjing Reality of Biological Warfare, New York, NY: 112 
St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare, New York, NY: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
Desmond Blow, “Basson Hints US Helped SA Develop Chemical Weapons,” City Press News, July 28, 2001. 114 
htt~:i/uwu~.news24.~orn/Gitu PressiGitv Press Ne\+ s/O,IX85.l86-187 I OS~O~4,OO.ht~n~ 
SADOCC (South Africa Documentation and Cooperation Center), “South Africa: Wouter Basson Acquitted 
Among Strong Protests,” April 12, 2002. h t t ~ :  /wmw.newt,24.com City Press City Press Neww0,lSXS. 186- 
1x7 ~ O S ~ ( ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ . ~ ~ t i n ~  
115 
‘16 Joby Warrick and John Mintz, “Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for Sale,” The Washington Post, April 20,2003. 
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900. Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
117 
200 1). 
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11 8,119 Sudan and Cuba have also been identified as pursuing biological weapons research. 
that may have a biological weapons program according to open literature but not confirmed by the DoD, 
include Israel,12’ Taiwan,’*’ and Egypt.’22 
Other states 
2.1.3 Revisiting the BWC 
The BWC has thus far seen only limited success in curbing the proliferation and guaranteeing the 
destruction of biological weapons. These limitations became most obvious following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union when it was discovered that, far from ending their offensive BW program, the Soviets 
expanded it into the largest biological weapons infrastructure in the world. 
Although 146 countries have ratified the BWC, the remaining 45 states recognized by the United Nations 
have not. While most of these non-member countries have little or no military capabilities, at least three 
critical nations -Egypt, Israel, and Syria - are conspicuously absent from the list of states parties. 
These three refusals, all inexorably linked to one another, have contributed to an elevated level of 
political tension and distrust in the Middle East. Universal ratification of the BWC, while not an absolute 
assurance of biological weapons control, would be an encouraging development toward greater global 
stability. 
The greatest point of contention within the BWC is the issue of verification. The BWC does not have a 
verification regime. Verification measures are typically the most difficult clauses to agree upon and the 
BWC was negotiated in a relatively short amount of time (1969-1972). Over the last decade, though, the 
international community has attempted to create an effective verification and inspection regime. In 1991, 
an Ad-Hoc Group of Government Experts was created to address the vexing problem, but all efforts failed 
when their draft Protocol was rejected outright by the United States in 2001. 
The justification for US rejection of the verification protocol stemmed from reasons relating to the unique 
nature of biological agents, as compared with other WMD-related materials, and the need to ensure 
industrial confidence. According to John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, “the draft Protocol would have been singularly ineffective.. .for three reasons: first, 
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“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January through 30 June 1998,” Nonproliferation Center. 
http:~/www.odci .aov/cia/publicationsibian/bian .html. 
118 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 119 
Agreements, Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998. 
Israel,” Center for Defense Information’s Chem-Bio Weapons Site. fitttl://wuw.cdi.ora/issues 120“ 
cbw~/israel.html. 
“Taiwan,” Center for Defense Information’s Chem-Bio Weapons Site. 121 
1ttt~:Ilwu w.cdi.org/issues cb\$ taiwan.htm1 
Disarmament Forum, “Biological Weapons: From the BWC to Biotech,” 2000. 
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State Year 
it was based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons; second, it 
would have compromised national security and confidential business information; and third, it would 
have been used by proliferators to undermine other effective international export control regimes.”123 
Types of Activities 
Following the rejection of the Protocol, the states parties agreed to hold three annual meetings starting in 
2003 to discuss alternatives to strengthen the Convention other than intrusive declarations and 
inspections. The topics include (1) national legislative measures outlawing the use of biological weapons, 
(2) securing pathogenic biological materials and toxins from theft, (3) national responses to suspicious 
disease outbreaks, (4) international disease surveillance, and ( 5 )  codes of conduct for those who work 
with pathogenic agents. It is hoped that decisions made at these meetings will augment the BWC with 
workable and efficient measures to curb the proliferation of biological weapons. 
Germany 
France 
Japan 
USSRlFSU 
UK 
Canada 
Iraq 
Iran 
us 
2.1.4 Summary 
The overall pattern of use throughout history strongly suggests that states view biological weapons as 
tactical, not strategic, weapons. A summary of state programs (confirmed and alleged), their years of 
operation, and the types of agents they explored are presented in Table 1. 
1914-45 (sporadic) R&D and Deployment 
1914-41 (sporadic) 
-191845 R&D Production, and 
1920s-present R&D Production, and Possible 
1936-69 R&D and Production 
Post WWI-1969 R&D and Production 
R&D and Production 
1980~-(2003)? R&D and Production 
? (intensified in 1995kmesent R&D 
R&D and Possible Deployment 
Deployment 
Deployment 
1942-69 
Table 1. Summary of State Programs 
China 
Syria 
Libva 
1950s-present R&D 
? - present R&D 
? - Dresent R&D 
India 
Pakistan 
North Korea 
South Africa 
? - present R&D 
? - present R&D 
1960s-present R&D; possible production 
? -1 994 R&D, Production, possible 
deDlovment 
lZ3 John Bolton, Transcript of Speech: “The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the 
BW Threat,” Tokyo, Japan, August 27, 2002. 
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Sudan 
Israel 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
8 
a 
a 
a 
? - present (?) R&D 
? - Present R&D 
Taiwan 
Egypt 
Overall, state programs tend to explore similar types of pathogens and toxins for weaponization. These 
pathogens or toxins include the following: 
? - present R&D 
? - present R&D 
Bacterial agents: anthrax, plague, tularemia, brucellosis, typhoid fever 
Rickettsial agents: typhus, Rocky Mountain Spotted fever, Q fever 
Viral agents: smallpox, influenza, yellow fever, encephalitis (various), Dengue fever, chikungunga, Rift 
Valley fever, hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Marburg, Lassa) 
Toxins: botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin, shigella toxin, aflatoxin 
Fungal agents: coccidiodomyocosis 
Other: anti-plant, anti-animal (FMD, Newcastle disease virus)’24 
2.2 Substate Actors 
Substate actors are individuals or groups that act outside of a nation-state’s governing institutions. It has 
long been assumed that substate actors would find biological weapons an attractive a tool of terrorism 
because of their low production costs. Additionally, pathogens, in contrast to other components of WMD, 
are widely available and in some cases may take less training and expertise to use in a nefarious fashion. 
Furthermore, biological materials emit very little energy, making detection of small amounts of material 
from a distance far more difficult than for other WMD components. 
The threat of a substate actor using a biological weapon in terrorism against the state is a primary concern 
of the US. While the US had always been aware of the threat of bioterrorism, the fall 2001 anthrax attacks 
focused attention on the issue and prompted increased biodefense efforts. This section defines the types of 
substate actors and explores the historical pattern of bioterrorism incidents, pathogen possession, 
attempted pathogen acquisition, and incidents of pathogen diversion. It concludes with an analysis of the 
bioterrorism threat. 
Bioterrorist acts discussed in this section are limited to the same time period as the previous section 
(1900-present). Unless otherwise noted, reported incidents come from the Monterey Institute of 
124 Steven M. Block, “Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular Biology,” The New Terror: 
Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, Sidney, B. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. 
Wilson (Eds.), Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999. 
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International Studies (MIIS) terrorism database. 125 As noted in Section 1.1.3, biocrimes are not 
discussed. 
2.2.1 Types of Substate Actors 
In an effort to simplify a complex issue, terrorists and terrorist organizations are placed within one of six 
categories. However, it is crucial to note that many actors may be justifiably placed in more than one 
category. This said, it is helpful to categorize the ideological underpinnings that inform terrorist 
motivations, goals, and strategies for using biological weapons. 126,127,128 This section explores the main 
categories of terrorist groups and organizations, the historical pattern of bioterrorism incidents, 
possession, attempted acquisition, and cases of pathogen diversion. It concludes with a general analysis of 
the overall threat that terrorists pose to the US in terms of intentional pathogen and toxin use. 
2.2.1.1 Social Revolutionaries 
Social revolutionary groups seek to replace capitalist economic, political, and social systems with 
socialism. Such groups were most active in the 1970s and 1980s. Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's 
Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, Peru's Sender0 Luminoso, and Colombia's Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (FARC) are examples of social revolutionaries. Although a number of these groups have remained 
active after the fall of the Soviet Union, their numbers worldwide have diminished. Several factors create 
disincentives for social revolutionary groups to use biological weapons: the need to maintain support 
among the country's population and external supporters, unfamiliarity with biological weapons, and 
difficulty acquiring and using biological weapons. For social revolutionaries, the reliability and versatility 
of conventional weapons has tended to overshadow the allure of biological weapons. 
The Monterey database does not restrict itself to documenting only incidents involving the actual use of a 
military-grade biological agent-it includes information referring to any indication of interest by subnational groups 
or individuals in biological materials. According to clearly delineated criteria, in certain circumstances incidents 
involving the use of non-warfare agents, the infliction of minimal casualties, and even threats of biological agent 
use are included in the database. See: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies' Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdtlindex.htm - 
subscription required. 
I ? <  
Richard Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer. America's Achilles Heel: 126 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
Jerrold M. Post, "Aum Shirinkyo (1995).," Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological I27 
Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
Jonathan B. Tucker, Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 128 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 200 1. 
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2.2.1.2 Nationalist-Separatists 
Nationalist-separatist groups generally fight to establish local autonomy or state sovereignty based on a 
desire for ethnic dominance or homogeneity. Nationalist-separatist groups who have been active in the 
past decade include the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque Fatherland, the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK), Liberty (ETA), as well as radical Palestinian groups, such as the AI-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
and the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). These groups 
have the same disincentives for biological weapons use that confront social revolutionary groups and 
historically have tended to limit their attacks to conventional weapons. However, the potential 
dissemination of biological weapons by nationalist-separatists remains a concern, particularly if the 
effects of an attack could be limited to the intended target. 
2.2.1.3 Religious Groups 
Over the last two decades violence by groups seeking to maintain or create a specific religious social and 
political order has become increasingly prevalent and lethal worldwide. 129 Religious groups that employ 
terrorism generally fall into one of two categories: (1) radical fundamentalists on the fringes of 
mainstream creeds-including Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism, and Hinduism; and (2) apocalyptic 
cults such as Japan’s Awn Shinrikyo. Extreme, absolutist doctrines and charismatic, dominant leadership 
from both groups tend to overcome the normal disincentives for biological weapons use. 
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It is important to note that the various categories of terrorist organizations presented here are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, Hamas and Hezbollah could be considered both nationalist-separatist and 
religious groups. Their religious ideologies become intertwined with their nationalist ambitions and, as a 
result, their actions are not easy to predict. 
2.2.1.4 Single Issue Groups 
Single issue groups use terrorist activities to advance their organization’s position on a particular political, 
economic, or social issue. While many issues could, theoretically, foster a violent response, to date the 
single issue groups associated with biological weapons threats have been environmental and anti-abortion 
groups. These biological weapons-related incidents have been low consequence events consisting of 
primarily hoaxes, pranks, and threats. 130 The combination of a single issue group with religious 
extremism could result in motivations to deploy a biological weapon. 
In 1968, none of the 11 international terrorist groups identified by the State Department were religious 
organizations. By 1992, 11 of 50 groups were designated by the State Department as terrorist groups were religious 
and by 2001 that number had grown to 27 of 61. See: (1) Richard Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and 
Bradley A. Thayer. America‘s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998.; (2) United States Department of State. 2000. Patterns of Global Terrorism 
1999. Washington, DC: Department of State. 
129 
130 The definition of HoaxIPranWThreat as listed within the Monterey Institute database: a hoax occurs if the 
perpetrator claims that slhe used an agent in the commission of an act and delivered a “fake” substance in place of 
the real thing. Pranks only differ from hoaxes in that there is no “fake” substance delivered with the claim. The 
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2.2.1.5 Right-Wing Groups 
Terrorist groups on the Right include a diverse set of groups, including xenophobic groups, neo-Nazis, 
skinheads, white supremacists, tax protesters, patriot militias, and fundamentalist Christian groups. Over 
the last 20 years, Right-wing violence has increased as social-revolutionary activity has declined. Right- 
wing violence has also become increasingly secular. Rightist violence has tended to be unsystematic and 
on a small scale-with the notable exception of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah Federal 
Building. That incident, and association of conservative politics with religious fundamentalism in a 
number of countries, suggests that Right-wing terrorists pose a threat of high consequence events. 13’ Such 
events could include an escalation to biological weapons attacks, as these groups have participated in an 
increasing number of biological weapons hoaxes, threats, and pranks in the last decade. Additionally, 
several individuals who associate themselves with these groups have been found in possession of 
potential biological weapons agents. 
2.2.1.6 Lone Actors 
Perhaps the most difficult substate actor to assess is the individual who operates outside of a group. Lone 
actors are the broadest, least predictable category of terrorists, spanning all the ideological incentives that 
motivate groups, as well as a variety of individual pathologies such as personal frustrations, revenge, 
economic gain, and perverse pleasure. Studies on insider espionage’32 and computer hacking’33 indicate 
that individual motivations for anti-social behavior are extremely difficult to isolate. 134 Most bioterrorism 
incidents involving lone actors are hoaxes or threats, likely because relatively few individuals have the 
capability or skill to acquire and use biological weapons. Indeed, the vast majority of perpetrators 
identified in the rash of biological hoaxes and threats after 1998 were lone actors. While some lone actors 
clearly had the capability to acquire and use low consequence biological agents and basic delivery 
methods, most did not. Nonetheless, a knowledgeable lone actor remains a danger. The lone actor 
threat element is when there is no evidence of possession by the perpetrator. As there is no confirmation of a 
realistic threat of actual use, these cases are placed on the same level as hoaxes or pranks. See: Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism 
database. http: icns.rnirs.edu db/wrn& index.htiii - subscription required. 
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, “The ‘New 
Terrorism’: Does It Exist? How Real Are the Risks of Mass Casualty Attacks?” Report of Proceedings, April 29-30, 
1999. http:/ ww w.cbaci.org Nemtenorism.htm 
131 
132 Defense Security Service, “Treason 101,” 2001. 
http:iiw~~iU..dss.mil/t~ainingicsf: e~u~ityi~reason 1~ i t ro .h t rn~~re~so~  10 1 
133 Sarah Gordon, “Studying the Psychology of Virus Writers and Hackers,” 2001. 
http: iwww.pbs.org wrbh payes frontlineishnws/hach-~rsiwhoareipslycho.htrnl 
Jerrold M. Post, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995),” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 134 
Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
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arguably poses the greatest threat as an insider, a scientist or technician with legitimate access to 
dangerous pathogens and toxins, and possibly the expertise to weaponize it. 
2.2.2 Bioterrorism Incidents 
The earliest reported incident of bioterrorism within the time period studied occurred in 19 10. The 
Pancho Villa guerillas, a nationalist-separatist group engaged in combat with federal troops during the 
Mexican revolution, used botulinum toxin that was cultured by placing cooked green beans in a sealed 
canister. Rotting pork was added to the beans one week later. The mixture was then buried in the canteens 
until swelling indicated the toxin was ready for use. Children dipped pottery shards or obsidian into the 
mixture and threw the shards at federal sentries. There is no report on the overall effectiveness of this 
incident. 135 
The next reported incident of bioterrorism occurred in 1947 but it lacks sufficient evidence for formal 
confirmation, according to MIIS. Allegedly, Palestinian Jewish groups used cholera against various water 
supplies in both Egypt and Syria in order to attack civilian populations. No injuries or casualties were 
reported. This alleged incident exemplifies the often intertwined goals of nationalist-separatist and 
religious groups. 136 
The first incident of agroterrorism within the studied time period occurred in Kenya in 1952. A 
nationalist-separatist group called the Mau Mau used African milk brush as a toxin against livestock. The 
Mau Mau cut incisions into the skin of 33 steers and put the latex of the plant directly into the wounds. 
Although eight steers died, the attack did not allow the Mau Mau to achieve their goal of 
independence. 137,1’38 
In 198 1, Dark Harvest, a single-issue group focused on environmental extremism, attempted to attack the 
scientists of Porton Down. Members of Dark Harvest delivered a package containing soil contaminated 
with Bacillus anthracis from Gruinard Island in an effort to protest the island’s environmental 
degradation. 
resulted from this attack. 
The group intended to return of the “seeds of death” to their sources.141 No injuries 139) 40 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction I35 
( WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/dblwmdthdex.htm - subscription required. 
13‘ Ibid. 
13’ Ibid. 
13’ W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, Center for 
Counterproliferation Research. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
2001). 
See section 2.1.1.3 on the British biological weapons program for a more detailed description of the Bacillus I39 
anthrucis experiments conducted on Gruinard Island. 
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One of the most significant incidents of bioterrorism occurred in the summer of 1984. On six separate 
occasions, the Rajneeshee religious cult deliberately contaminated salad bars with salmonella bacterial4* 
in The Dalles, Oregon. The cult was founded in India in the 1960s by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh. By 1981, 
when the cult relocated to the US, its membership had grown to include wealthy followers, lawyers, and 
lab technicians. Prior to the 1984 attack, the cult had engaged in numerous legal battles with other Wasco 
County residents, and had unsuccessfully tried to “take over” the county through the electoral process. 
When this failed, they attempted to keep other members of the county away from the ballots on Election 
Day by sickening enough residents to influence the outcome of the elections. The group purchased 
salmonella in the form of “bactrol disks” from Seattle based medical supplier VWR Scientific. The 
Rajneeshee attacks resulted in 776 cases of illness, but no deaths. 143 
The malicious nature of the event went unnoticed until a Rajneeshee cult member confessed after being 
arrested on unrelated charges over a year after the event.’44 Although the Rajneeshee failed to achieve 
their ultimate goal-winning the election and gaining control of the town-the 1984 attacks succeeded in 
showing the real danger of bioterrorism. Even more troubling is that the group also possessed Salmonella 
typhi (the causative agent for typhoid fever). While we cannot know whether the group-if they indeed 
possessed the bacteria-intended mass casualties, the mere fact that they may have possessed Salmonella 
typhi is cause for concern. 145,146,147,148 
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
140 
2001). 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 141 
(WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/index.htm - subscription required. 
Salmonella is a food-borne disease most often associated with spoiled fish, chicken, eggs, and dairy products and 
can cause severe gastrointestinal distress, fever, cramps, and diarrhea soon after infection. Although victims can 
become dehydrated by diarrhea and may require hospitalization, they usually recover within 4 to 7 days without 
treatment. In rare cases, the disease can spread from the intestines to the blood stream and cause infection in other 
parts of the body, leading to death if not treated with antibiotics. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
httn: /www.cdc.~crov ncidod dbmd/discaseinfo/salmonellosls e.htm. 
142 
Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, “Salmonellosis,” 2000. 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 143 
(WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/index.htm - subscription required. 
Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 144 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 145 
(WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miiwdu db ~ ~ i n d t / i ~ d ~ ~ . h t t ~  - subscription required. 
W. S. Carus, “The Rajneeshees (1984),” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 146 
Weapons. Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 115-138,2000. 
Jonathan Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 55(4), JulyIAugust 147 
1999. 
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In 1989, a single-issue group in California, the Breeders, undertook a campaign of threatened 
agroterrorism. The group was primarily concerned with the use of pesticides in agriculture. The Breeders 
openly challenged the agricultural industry by threatening to release the Medfly every time they 
witnessed any type of crop dusting. While researchers were unable to determine whether or not the 
Breeders followed through on their threat, they did notice unusual patterns to the Medfly infestation. 
Nevertheless, the Breeders neither caused any significant damage nor affected any change in agricultural 
pesticide use. Despite an investigation by USDA and other organizations, the Breeders seemed to have 
dispersed following their original threat.’49 
In the early 1990s, the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo made several attempts at bioterrorism, but 
is best known for successfully disseminating sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. The Aum Shinrikyo 
cult was led by the charismatic leader Shoko Asahara, who had an apocalyptic vision for a new world 
where he would be supreme leader. Asahara founded the company Aum Inc. in 1984; he also ran yoga 
clinics and produced health drinks. He soon became interested in spirituality and began to claim that he 
had supernatural powers. As his fame grew, so did his funding. Eventually, Asahara told followers that 
God had spoken to him and had chosen him to lead God’s army. He began to follow the teachings of a 
historian who claimed Armageddon would come in the year 2000, leaving few survivors. The survivors’ 
leader would be from Japan. Shortly thereafter, Asahara changed the name of his company to Aum 
Shinrikyo, or Supreme Truth. 
In order to prepare for a nuclear war that he had originally thought would commence in the late 1980s, 
Asahara recruited scientists to develop his own chemical and biological weapons arsenal.’’’ By the early 
1990s, the cult had developed an extensive biological weapons capability to carry out its doomsday 
agenda. Aum Shinrikyo’s program had a cadre of university and graduate-level trained microbiologists, 
dedicated to creating biotechnology facilities with significant funding. They worked undetected for four 
years. Their first targets, in April 1990, were the US Navy bases at Yokohama and Yokosuka, the Narita 
airport, the Japanese Diet, and the Imperial Palace. The group attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin 
in the form of mist sprayed from a truck. This attempt failed for unknown reasons. Investigators suspect 
that the group may have used a weak strain of the toxin. 151~152 
There were six subsequent attacks in 1993, all of which failed. The first of these attacks-June 1993- 
used botulinum toxin directed at guests of the wedding of Prince Naruhito. Similar to the previous attack, 
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Leonard Cole, “The Specter of Biological Weapons,” Scientific American, December 1996. 148 
tittp: /wmw.scmxcom 129hissue/l296cole.I~tml 
149 Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/index.htm - subscription required. 
150 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999. 
15’ Kyle B. Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” Emerging Infectious Diseases. 5(4), JulyIAugust 
2000. 
152 W. J. Broad, S. Wu Dunn, and Judith Miller, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” The New York Times, 
May 26, 1998. 
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the group sprayed a mist of the toxin from a car. By the time of the second attack-July 1993-the group 
had switched to Bacillus anthracis. Aum Shinrikyo attempted to spray Bacillus anthracis spores from the 
top of their Kameido compound in Tokyo. The spray device was equipped with a fan that would further 
disseminate the agent. Residents of the neighborhood noticed a foul odor. When police investigated 
further, residents also reported a sticky substance on the street as well as “steam” coming from the Aum 
Shinrikyo compound. Aum Shinrikyo refused to allow the police into its building for further inspection. 
Three more anthrax incidents occurred in July 1993. All these disseminations were aimed at civilians in 
Tokyo, including two attempts at dissemination of the bacteria from a moving vehicle and one from the 
roof of its compound. The key factor in Aum Shinrikyo’s failure was use of a vaccine strain of anthrax. 
The last incident occurred in March 1995, when the group again attempted to disseminate botulinum 
toxin from three brief cases equipped with spraying devices. This attempt failed because the cult member 
responsible for placing the brief cases changed his mind and replaced the toxin with water. 
153 
154 
In spite of extensive expertise and resources, A m  Shinrikyo’s efforts to produce an effective biological 
weapon were unsuccessful. The A m  Shinrikyo cult gathered their biological collection from a variety of 
sources. In 1990, Asahara sent a team to Hokkaido Island, Lake Akan, Kunashiri Island, and Tokachi 
River to collect Clostidium botulinum from soil samples. They also purchased Clostridium botulinum 
from a pharmaceutical company through a “front” company. They purchased various types of equipment 
in order to process their biological weapons. When police raided their biological weapons facility in 
Kamikuishiki, Yamanashi Prefecture, they found 17 buildings containing 300 books on biochemistry, 
books on culturing botulinium toxin, a computer disk containing information on biological weapons 
research, bacteria incubators, actual cultures, and various chemicals. Police also found blueprints for the 
construction of a bioscience research facility, indicating Aum Shinrikyo was planning to build a four- 
story, steel-framed structure approximately 1,700 square meters and surrounded by concrete. 
Despite their efforts, no injuries or fatalities resulted from any of Aum Shinrikyo’s bioterrorism activities. 
155, 156,157 
Another attempted bioterror incident occurred in Tajikistan in 1995 and involved an Afghani warlord’s 
acquisition of hepatitis virus from a local hospital. He subsequently sold infected fruit to Russian troops 
in Tajikistan as part of an effort to aid nationalist-separatists movements in Tajikistan. Notably, there was 
a small number of subsequent hepatitis illnesses among Russian troops during this same time period. 158 
Milton Leitenberg, “The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents,” Hype or 
Reality? The New Terrorism and Mass Casualty Attacks, Brad Roberts (Ed.), Alexandria, VA, The Chemical and 
Biological Arms Control Institute, 159-1 70, 2000. 
153 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 154 
(WMD) terrorism database. http: icns.i7iiis.eduldbi\,vn~dt indexhtm - subscription required. 
Ibid. 
156 Kellman, “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,” op. cit. 
15’ Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 
15* Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) terrorism database. http: cnc ~ i i i s . ~ ~ ~ u / ~ b / ~ r ~ d ~  tndcx htm - subscription required. 
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The next three incidents of bioterrorism took place in 2000. The first took place in January and involved 
gay sex and advice columnist Dan Savage, who reportedly attempted to infect presidential candidate Gary 
Bauer with influenza by first joining his presidential campaign staff and then touching, coughing, and 
licking various elements in Bauer’s campaign headquarters (e.g., doorknobs, keyboards). Savage also 
asked Mr. Bauer for an autograph after sucking on the pen he had handed him. Bauer’s campaign 
manager did come down with the flu; however, Bauer did not. Savage was charged with fraudulent voter 
registration and illegal voting in a primary election, but was not charged with a s s a ~ 1 t . I ~ ~  Savage was 
particularly upset with the anti-homosexual aspects of the Bauer campaign; consequently, this attack is 
likely an example of a lone actor concerned with a single-issue. 
The second incident occurred in May 2000, when Palestinian nationalist-separatists used a machine to 
place counterfeit stamps on expired and salmonella-tainted eggs destined for sale in Israel. The scheme 
was not detected for 18 months. Inspectors from the Israeli Agricultural Development Authority 
eventually discovered the scheme, and the perpetrators were apprehended. It is unknown how many 
individuals became sick with salmonella. A Tel Aviv woman died from salmonella poisoning during this 
time period.’60 
The last incident, also in Israel, occurred in June 2000. This time, Israeli settlers from the Efrat settlement 
on the West Bank are reported to have deliberately released sewer water into Palestinian agricultural 
fields. Palestinians claim that Israelis attack them annually in this manner, attempting to remove 
Palestinian farmers from their land. Farmers estimate their damages at approximately $5,000; however, 
no human infections were reported.161 As with the prior incident in Israel, this was primarily a nationalist- 
separatist attack. 
The most recent biological attack occurred in the fall of 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist events. These 
attacks used letters containing weaponized anthrax’62 that were sent through the US Postal Service 
(USPS). Following these attacks, 11 inhalation and 11 cutaneous (7 confirmed and 4 suspected) cases of 
anthrax were identified in the US. Five deaths resulted from contracting the inhalation form of the 
disease.’63 Prior to these attacks, no US citizen was known to have died from bioterrorism within the 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
162 In contrast to non-weaponized Bacillus anthracis, weaponized Bacillus anthracis has been milled to a very small 
particulate size so that it may more easily lodge in the smallest brachials of the lung. Additionally, the Bacillus 
anthracis had been coated with a substance to eliminate the electrostatic charge. Thus, the spores would not be 
attracted to one another and clump together. 
Thomas V. Inglesby, Tara O’Toole, Donald A. Henderson, John G. Bartlett, Michael S .  Ascher, Edward Eitzen, 
Arthur M. Friedlander, Julie Gerberding, Jerome Hauer, James Hughes, Joseph McDade, Michael T. Osterholm, 
Gerald Parker, Trish M. Perl, Philip K. Russell, and Kevin Tonat, “Consensus Statement, Anthrax as a Biological 
Weapon, Updated “Recommendations for Management,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 287( 17), 
2236-2252. May 1, 2002. bttD:/ iama arna-avmorgiissues ~2871117 i\t20007.html For a description of the US 
anthrax cases see: http /\?..wW.cdc.aov/nciDon E113 vol7noh~ierniaan.htm. 
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US. 164 Approximately 10,000 individuals were potentially exposed to the bacteria and treatment 
consisting of at least 60 days of post-exposure antibiotic prophylaxis was recommended. 165 In addition, 
many government and public buildings were shut down because of evidence of contamination. As of this 
writing, the perpetrator(s) remain unknown. Consequently, specific motivations andor group identity (if 
applicable) also remain unknown. Finally, although the strain of anthrax used has been identified (the 
Ames strain), it is unknown whether or not its release was the result of theft by an individual who had 
legitimate access or self-manufactured by a knowledgeable “insider.” 
In summary, six bioterrorism incidents have been perpetrated by national-separatist groups, with three of 
those also qualifying as religious groups. Two incidents have been perpetrated by right-wing groups, two 
incidents by single-issue groups, and two incidents by religious groups. The three most significant 
bioterrorism incidents have been the Rajneeshee salmonella poisoning, the Aum Shinrikyo attempted 
anthrax and botulinum toxin dissemination, and the unsolved anthrax attacks of 2001. Table 2 presents a 
summary of bioterrorist events by substate actors. This table includes both alleged and confirmed attacks. 
guerillas 
Palestinian Jewish 
groups 
Mau-Mau 
Dark Harvest 
Rajneeshee 
The Breeders 
Aum Shinrikyo 
Afghani Warlord 
Dan Savage 
Palestinians 
Table 2. Summary of Bioterrorism Incidents 
Type of Actor Year Agent($ Relative Success 
I Unknown Nationalist- I 1910 I Botulinum toxin seDaratist 
I 1947 I Cholera I Unknown Nationalist- seDaratist 
Nationalist- 1952 African milk brush Successful - Eight steers 
separatist killed 
Single-issue 1981 Bacillus anthracis Unsuccessful 
Religious 1984 Salmonella Successful - 776 people 
tvDhimurium sickened 
Single-issue 1989 Medfly Unknown 
Re I ig io us 1990- Botulinum toxin, Unsuccessful 
Nationalist- 1995 Hepatitis Unknown 
seDaratist 
1995 Bacillus anthracis 
Lone actor/singIe- I 2000 I Influenza 
issue 
Unknown - one individual 
sickened but may not be 
related 
Nationalist- 2000 Salmonella Unknown - operation in 
separatist typhimurium effect for 18 months prior 
to detection 
164 Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 55(4):4, 
JulyIAugust 1999. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Notice to Readers: Evaluation of Post-Exposure Antibiotic 
Prophylaxis to Prevent Anthrax,” MMWR, 51(03):59, January 25, 2002. 
http :/ \v ww . cdc . EOV n ~ n w r l ~ ~ r e w e w  mmwrhtml/mm~ 103 a4. h t m 
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Israeli settlers 
Unknown 
Nationalist- 2000 Sewer water 
separatist (unspecified 
bacteria) 
Unknown 1 2001 I Bacillus anthracis possible crop damage 
tens of thousands put on 
antibiotic treatment 
2.2.3 Incidents of Possession 
In addition to actual bioterrorism incidents, MIIS identifies several cases where individual(s) had 
unauthorized possession of pathogens but did not deploy them. Whether or not these individuals would 
have deployed these pathogens remains unclear. However, possession remains an important component of 
understanding the threat of BW use. 
In 1972, two members of the radical group RISE were arrested for possession of Salmonella typhi with 
intent to release it into the water supply of Chicago. RISE can best be described as a combination of both 
a single-issue group and an apocalyptic (though non-religious) group. RISE was concerned with the 
impact of humans on the planet and believed that all but a small group of people should be killed. 
Originally, RISE considered using several agents (including anthrax, cholera, and meningitis) in an effort 
to confke public health officials. However, the two potential perpetrators were discovered before they 
could implement the plan. After their arrest, both members were arraigned on bail. They immediately 
flew to Jamaica. In 1972, they hijacked an aircraft and flew to Cuba. One was subsequently arrested in 
Cuba for counter-revolutionary activities and died in 1974; the other returned to the US in 1995, when he 
pled guilty and received five years’ probation.166 
In 1995, four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council-a Right-wing militia group-were tried and 
convicted under the 1989 Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act for possession of ricin. Patriot groups 
throughout the US are organized under the belief that the federal government has overstepped its bounds 
and that all power and authority should rest solely in the hands of local officials. The men ordered a mail 
order ricin kit in 1991 that was advertised in a Right-wing bulletin. They intended to mix the ricin with 
hand lotion that they planned to distribute to government officials, sheriffs, US Marshals, and IRS agents. 
A dispute erupted between one of the conspirators and his wife, resulting in the wife’s decision to turn the 
ricin over to local authorities. When convicted, each man received prison sentences of less than five 
years. 167 
Also in 1995, Thomas Lewis Lavy was found in possession of 130 grams of ricin with intent to use the 
toxin as a weapon. Additionally, officials found approximately 1.5 pounds of castor beans at his home 
along with books detailing how ricin is made. Previously, Lavy had been stopped at the US-Canadian 
border with ricin; however, he was not arrested. Lavy claimed that the ricin was for killing coyotes 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) terrorism database. http://cns.miis.edu/db/wmdt/index.htm - subscription required. 
Ibid. 
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around his Arkansas home, but he is believed to have maintained ties with local survivalist groups and 
far-Right Christian fundamentalist groups. Lavy hanged himself in jail in 1995.’68 
Perhaps the most famous incident of pathogen possession is that of Larry Wayne Harris. In 1995, Harris 
ordered three vials of plague from the ATCC using his employer’s state certification. The ATCC became 
suspicious of Harris and notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). A 1997 raid on 
Harris’ home discovered the three vials, which were still in their original ~ 0 n t a i n e r . l ~ ~  A further search of 
his home found explosives and material indicating that Harris was a member of the Right-wing group 
Aryan Nation, a white supremacist organization. Because it was not illegal to possess human pathogens, 
Harris was arrested for obtaining the bacteria through falsified documents. Harris claimed that he was 
researching the pathogen to counter what he believed was a threat from Saddam Hussein to release 
“super-germ-carrying rats” in the US. Harris was subsequently convicted in 1997. 170 
James Dalton Bell was discovered with ricin and botulinum toxin in 1997. Bell had a long history of anti- 
US government activity. In 1989, police found 10 barrels of phenyl acetic acid (used for the production of 
methamphetamine) in Bell’s possession. Bell was charged for failing to report the receipt of chemical 
substances. In 1997, IRS officials searched Bell’s home and found numerous chemicals, including 
hydrochloric acid, sodium cyanide, nitric acid, and sulfuric acid as well as the two toxins. Also in 1997, 
federal officials raided the home of Bell’s friend Robert East looking for information on Bell. The warrant 
specified that the agents were looking specifically for anthrax, sarin, and rocket launchers. Again in 1997 
after being arrested that day for tax violations, Bell exploded a “stink bomb” at the IRS office in 
Vancouver, Washington using the chemical mercaptan. Bell served 11 months for incidents related to tax 
violations and was released in April 1998 with three years probation. Bell violated the conditions of his 
parole by threatening US officials. He was convicted in 1999 on four felony counts of threatening 
individuals via e-mail. By 2000, Bell was out of prison and had been rearrested for stalking two Treasury 
Department agents.’ 71 Bell’s anti-government rhetoric places him within the Right-wing group 
designation. 
In 1997, a British newspaper published an article based on an interview with Seydo Hazar, an ex-member 
of the Kurdistan’s Worker’s Party (PKK)-a nationalist-separatist group that advocates the creation of a 
Kurdish state. In the article, Hazar claimed that the PKK had been exploring several different types of 
crude delivery systems for rat poison, sarin, and potassium cyanide. In addition to these, Hazar reported 
Ibid. 
169 The two-year delay in investigating Harris was likely because the first “select agent” law was not signed until 
1996. 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 170 
(WMD) terrorism database. http:llcns.miis.eduldb/wmdtlindex.htm - subscription required. 
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that PKK possessed Escherichia coli 0157:H7 and botulinum toxin. The weapons were to be used to kill 
tourists on Turkish beaches.17* 
In 1997, Thomas C. Leahy threatened to poison his mother and former wife with homemade ricin. He also 
had indicated that he was making a “killer virus” that he planned to place on razor blades and then send to 
“his enemies” through the mail. In addition, Leahy claimed to have developed an airborne bacterium that 
he planned to distribute in a similar fashion. Leahy pled guilty to engaging in terrorist acts and received a 
12-year term; however, on appeal that sentence was reduced to six and a half years.’73 Although Leahy 
specifically threatened family members (making this incident a biocrime rather than a bioterrorist event), 
the group that comprised his “enemies” was never fully determined. Thus, Leahy can best be described as 
a lone actor with unspecified goals. 
Also in 1997, the journalist Steve Emerson reported that Israeli intelligence believed Hamas, an Islamic 
fundamentalist group, had possession of unspecified biological weapons components. These components 
were allegedly obtained from various Israeli hospitals. In addition, a 1998 media report suggested that ex- 
CIA Director James Woolsey stated that Hezbollah, another Islamic militant group, had acquired both 
biological and chemical weapons with the help of two Swiss businessmen. No further information is 
available on this incident and no biological agents were ever found in the possession of these 
organizations. 174 Both Hamas and Hezbollah are nationalist-separatist and religious groups. 
In 1998, the Turkish police confiscated 960 glass tubes of cobra poison from three PKK members. As 
many as 1,500 tubes may have been purchased by the PKK. However, the members who were arrested in 
connection with this case claimed that they sold some of the tubes to an unnamed person. The venom is 
thought to have originated in Azerbaijan.’75 
In 2000, Chechen rebels fighting for independence from Russia reportedly acquired a “biological agent” 
(presumed to have been anthrax). The report originated from a source within the Dagestani Interior 
Ministry. The Russian spokesperson for matters relating to Chechnya refuted the report, indicating that 
the Russian government did not believe that the Chechens had either the technical means or expertise to 
effectively develop an anthrax weapon.’76 
Of the incidents of possession, four were perpetrated by Right-wing groups; three by nationalist-separatist 
groups; one incident each by a lone actor and single-issue group; and one incident by a group who can 
best be described as both a nationalist-separatist group and a religious group (Hamas/Hezbollah). Each 
17’ Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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incident involved agents that could be cultured or readily obtained from nature.’77 A summary of the 
incidents of possession (alleged and confirmed) is presented in Table 3. 
Actor Type of Actor Year 
Table 3: Summary of Incidents of Possession 
Agent(s) 
I RISE I Single-issue 1972 
1995 1 Right-wing Minnesota Patriots Council 
Typhoid 
Ricin 
Thomas Lewis Lavy 
Larry Wayne Harris 
James Dalton Bell 
Rig ht-wing 1995 Ricin 
Right-wing 1995 Yersinia pestis 
Riaht-wina 1997 Ricin, botulinum toxin 1 PKK 
Thomas C. Leahy 
Hamas/Hezbolla h 
PKK 
Nationalist-separatist 
Ricin, “killer virus” 
(unspecified) 
Unspecified BW 
components 
Lone Actor 1997 
Religious/Nationalist- 
separatist 
Nationalist-SeDaratist 1998 Cobra Doison 
1997/1998 
1997 
Escherichia coli 
0157:H7, botulinum 
toxin 
1 Chechen rebels I Nationalist-separatist 1 2000 Unspecified “biological I aaent” 
2.2.4 Incidents of Attempted Acquisition 
This section examines the historical record of attempted acquisition as reported by MIIS. In all, there have 
been five reported attempts of acquisition; however, this summary should not be considered the definitive 
authority. Many agents (as is shown in the above record) can be acquired directly from nature. 
Consequently, these incidents only represent what MIIS has found in the public record. 
In 1914, a group of anarchists attempted to smuggle cholera from Switzerland to Russia via fountain pens. 
These individuals were believed to be part of a larger nationalist-separatist ~rganization.”~ 
In 1980 in Paris France the social revolutionary group Baader-Meinhof (dedicated to overthrowing the 
German government) attempted to acquire a sample of botulinum toxin. 179 A police raid on an apartment 
77 Several of the incidents report only unspecified “biological agents.” Without additional information, it is 
impossible to characterize the agents. 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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in Paris uncovered a miniature laboratory designed to produce botulinum toxin.”’ Also found were 
medical journals and papers on bacteriology. Among the various biological weapons components, police 
also found presses, rubber stamps, passports, forged documents, a detonator, and instructions for 
manufacturing bombs. However, the police failed to inventory the items found in the apartment; 
consequently, there is no firm record on whether or not the biological weapons components found are as 
listed.’” 
In 1992, Aum Shinrikyo made an attempt to acquire Ebola. Members traveled to Zaire during an outbreak 
to collect a sample of the virus. The group traveled under the guise of bringing medical assistance to the 
victims of the outbreak. They called their trip the “African Salvation Tour.” Ultimately, however, the 
attempt was unsuccessful.”* 
In 1997, an unknown biological agent is reported to have been the object of an attempted acquisition in 
Sudan. The perpetrator(s) remain unknown as does their motivation and intended target. It is believed that 
some type of terrorist group was attempting to build a facility for both chemical and biological weapons 
work in Sudan.lS3 
After their August 1999 arrest, individuals loyal to Osama bin Laden reported that they had been able to 
acquire Bacillus anthvacis through the mail, and had attempted to obtain botulinum toxin. Such claims 
have an unpleasant credibility, as information exists that former Warsaw Pact countries as well as some 
Far Eastern nations openly supply biological agents (such as Ebola) without properly verifying the 
identities of the  purchaser^.'^^ The DoD has also confirmed that followers of Osama bin Laden have 
trained to use toxic  chemical^.'^^ 
179 The truthfulness of this event has recently been questioned. But because it is still commonly cited, it has been 
included in this discussion. 
I8O J. D. Douglas, Jr. and N. C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare, 
Lexington, MA, Lexington Brooks, 1987. 
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David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo (1995).” Toxic Terror: Assessing the Terrorist Use of Chemical and 182 
Biological Weapons. Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
183 Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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Overall, there have been attempted acquisitions by two nationalist-separatist groups, one religious group, 
and one combination nationalist-separatist and religious group (bin Laden’s A1 Qaeda). The last attempted 
acquisition remains unclear as to whom-what type of g r o u p w a s  responsible. A summary of attempted 
acquisitions appears in Table 4. 
Actor Type of Actor Year 
Table 4: Summary of Attempted Acquisitions 
Agent($ 
Anarchists 
Baader-Mein hof 
Aurn Shinrikyo 
Unknown 
Osama bin Laden (AI 
Qaeda) 
Social revolutionaries 1914 Cholera 
Social revolutionaries 1980 Botulinum toxin 
Religious 1992 Ebola 
Unknown 1997 Unknown 
Nationalist- 1999-present botulinum toxin, 
separatists/Religious Dossiblv others 
Bacillus anthracis, 
2.2.5 The Special Case of Diversion 
Diversion of high consequence pathogens and toxins from legitimate institutions poses a distinct threat, as 
such materials can be used for biological weapons proliferation or attacks. In February 2001, the US 
National Defense University published a study, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological 
Agents Since 1900.lS6 In 11 of the 33 cases involving acquisition of biological agents, substate actors 
obtained the material from legitimate culture collections. The agents included those that cause plague, 
botulism, tetanus, and typhoid. The pathogens were obtained legitimately or through the use of falsified 
documents. At the time of these events, there were no national regulations in place to control the 
possession or transfer of such high consequence agents. In an additional three cases, the perpetrators 
acquired their biological agents by stealing them from research or medical laboratories. The agents 
involved cause dysentery (Shigella dysenteriae type 2), typhoid, and roundworm. The perpetrators were 
“insiders,” scientific staff with legitimate access to the facilities where the pathogens were kept, who 
187 
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, Washington, DC: 186 
National Defense University, August 1998 (February 2001 Revision). 
In order to address individuals’ ability to acquire and possess biological weapons, the US Congress passed the 
Biological Weapons Act of 1989, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the Public Health 
and Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. Prior to these laws, there were no federal 
prohibitions on individuals possessing any biological agents regardless of their lethality or whether the individual 
had a legitimate use for the agents. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the 2002 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act outline specific restrictions and regulations regarding the use and 
transfer of certain high consequence pathogens and toxins. 
httD: /usmfo.state. cov usali1ifousa/laws/ma~orlaw/s735 enr.htm; http: Jwu w cdc.gov/odlohs/lrsat 42cfs72.htm and 
http: /www.fcPa.g~v ochiotcnrorism PLlO7-I 88 .~df .  For a more complete discussion on US laws, see James R. 
Ferguson (JD), “Policy Perspectives: Biological Weapons and US Law,” Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 278(5), 1997. This article outlines the history of attempts made by the US to regulate BW research, 
development, and use by individual citizens. The article does not include laws following the fall 2001 Bacillus 
anthracis attacks. 
187 
Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of BW Use 51 
seemed to be motivated by personal grudges or desire for revenge. In all of these cases, the perpetrators 
identified culture collections or repositories as the preferred source for acquiring pathogens, even though 
they had the technical skills to culture the organisms from nature. 
There is little information in the open literature related to incidents of diversion at federal laboratories. In 
1986, a former researcher at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID) charged that 60 to 70 various sized vials containing almost 2,500 milliliters of 
Chikungunya virus’88 went missing in 1981. US Army officials denied that the virus had been diverted, 
but a Congressional hearing was held on the subject in 1988. To date there has been no resolution on what 
exactly happened to the missing vials. 189,190 
In 1992, an internal US Army audit found that 27 specimens of various agents were missing from 
USAMRIID. A search of the laboratory subsequently turned up all but three of the missing 27 specimens. 
It is unclear whether those specimens contained any viable or virulent microbes. 191,192 Additionally, 
media reports have speculated that the anthrax attacks in the United States during the fall of 2001 were 
perpetuated by someone who had access to and removed virulent Bacillus anthracis strains from a US 
biological research laboratory. 
Although mass casualties have not resulted to date, diversion and use of HCPTs has occurred on 
numerous occasions, and may pose a serious risk. Furthermore, the fall 200 1 US anthrax attacks indicate 
that bioterrorists either possess or have access to relevant scientific expertise. The unusually virulent 
nature of the strain, 
factors in the five reported deaths. 
193 as well as the small particle size of the spores and unique coating, were critical 
Chikungunya virus is a togavirus that is rarely fatal but causes acute illness that can be incapacitating to humans. I xx 
There is no treatment currently available. 
Philip J. Hilts, “Former Army Researcher Says Quart of Disease Virus Disappeared,” The Washington Post, 
September 24, 1986. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, looth Congress, Second Session, July 27-28, 1988. 
I X9 
I9O Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs. United States Senate, looth Congress, July 27-28, 1988. 
Rick Weiss and Joby Warrick, “Army Lost Track of Anthrax Bacteria,” The Washington Post, January 21,2002. 191 
192 Joby Warick, “No One Asked Questions,” The Washington Post, February 19,2002. 
193 The strain of Bacillus anthracis used in the US Bacillus anthracis attacks has been identified as the Ames strain. 
Virulent forms of Bacillus anthracis, such as the Ames strain, carry two large plasmids that contain virulence 
factors of toxin and capsule production. See Timothy D. Read, Steven L. Salzberg, Mihai Pop, Martin Shumway, 
Lowell Umayam, Lingxia Jiang, Erik Holtzapple, Joseph D. Busch, Timothy L. Smith, James M. Schupp, Daniel 
Solomon, Paul Keim, Claire M. Fraser, “Comparative Genome Sequencing for Discovery of Novel Polymorphisms 
in Bacillus anthraci,” Science, May 9, 2002. 
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2.2.5 Summary 
Based on the historical record of bioterrorism incidents, two broad patterns of bioagent acquisition and 
biological weapons use emerge: (1) substate actors appear to be more willing than states to use pathogens 
and toxins to achieve goals and (2) substate actors are more likely than states to use pathogens and toxins 
that are readily available. While the number of bioterrorism incidents has been growing, mass casualty 
attacks have not been a part of this new commitment. This does not mean that groups will not try to 
obtain pathogens or toxins, particularly HCPTs. Indeed, the cases of Aum Shinrikyo and the anthrax 
attacks of fall 200 1 indicate that there may be individual(s) who will use HCPTs. However, the 
Rajneeshee attack underscores another important element of bioterrorism: different substate actors may 
pursue bioterrorism for different ends and with different motivations. The Rajneeshees intended to 
conceal their use of bioterrorism; by contrast, other substate actors have sought to claim responsibility for 
their actions. This fact highlights the importance of understanding motivations of different groups. 
Bioterrorism has not caused mass casualties to date.’94 Nonetheless, bioterrorism has resulted in 
numerous high consequence events. As the anthrax attacks in the US during the fall of 2001 
demonstrated, low-casualty bioterrorism can cause significant economic, social, and political 
disturbances. 
In assessing the likelihood of bioterror attacks, one must first determine whether biological weapons are 
the weapons of choice for terrorists. The vast majority of terrorist incidents have involved conventional 
means of attack, such as the use of guns, hijackings, and car and suicide bombs. Although the reasons for 
the predominance of conventional over biological weapons as the tools of choice for terrorists are unclear, 
some scholars cite the following self-imposed constraints: (1) the difficulty in coordinating and carrying 
out the logistics and other organizational hurdles for larger or more technologically complex operations 
(e.g., the Aum Shinrikyo attempts); (2) the desire for publicity and not mass deaths (e.g., the Rajneeshee 
salmonella poisoning); and ( 3 )  the desire not to alienate their members or supporters. 
Furthermore, terrorists seem to prefer the instant gratification obtained from using conventional weapons 
in their attacks. Not only is the effect of a BW delayed, but terrorists may also believe that they will have 
more control over, and more confidence in, a conventional weapon’s effectiveness. Finally, the recent 
examples of terrorism against the US (e.g., the 9/11 attacks, the USS Cole, the African Embassy 
bombings, and the Murrah Federal Building bombing) demonstrate a desire to use asymmetrical means to 
inflict highly symbolic (and emotional) damage. Historically, biological weapons have not been effective 
in this capacity, but current concerns over bioterrorism may indicate a changing role for biological 
weapons. 
195) 96,197 
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Indeed, in the 1990s, terrorism analysts noted a new form of terrorism emerging, one that was more 
lethal, indiscriminate, and complex, involving new adversaries, motivations, and methods. 
events of September 1 1,2001, as well as the anthrax attacks in the US, have underscored the concern over 
whether or not incidents of bioterrorism will increase in the future. This question remains unanswered. In 
addition, there have been unsubstantiated but disturbing reports that samples of smallpox may exist at 
more than the two approved laboratories in Siberia and Atlanta,’O1 as well as experts’ assertions that a 
biological weapons event involving smallpox would have devastating consequences on today’s largely 
unvaccinated populace.’” Suspicion that particular substate actors-especially a1 Qaeda-are interested 
in biological weapons has also fueled concern about the risk of bioterrorism. Rapid advances in 
bioengineering and biotechnology, growth in the number of high-containment facilities worldwide, 
consolidation in US and international agricultural business, and a fundamental weakness in biological 
arms control may persuade states and/or substate actors to pursue bioterrorism and /or biological weapons 
proliferation. However, it is important to evaluate the technical hurdles a would-be bioterrorist would 
have to overcome to perpetrate a successful bioterrorism event. 
The 198,199,200 
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199 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 
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Ian 0. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins, 200 
Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica, RAND, 1999. 
William J. Broad and Judith Miller, “Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox,” The New 20 1 
York Times, June 13, 1999. 
202Tara O’Toole, “Smallpox: An Attack Scenario,” Emerging Infectious Diseases. 5, 1999. 
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3. Technical Hurdles 
An understanding of the technical hurdles required to create and deploy biological weapons is necessary 
to gain a filler understanding of the biological weapons threat. Typically, successful biological weapon 
development and deployment require successful navigation of the following technical hurdles: (1) 
acquisition of a virulent pathogen or toxin; (2) production of the agent; ( 3 )  processing of the agent; (4) 
employing an appropriate delivery form and device; and ( 5 )  deploying the agent effectively. 
overcome these technical hurdles requires knowledge, skill, and equipment. 
203,204,205 To 
Biological weapons are fundamentally different from both nuclear and chemical weapons in ways that 
make them a more attractive option to some state and substate actors. First, biological weapons are made 
up of living microorganisms capable of reproducing within a host. Thus, while nuclear and chemical 
weapons usually require large amounts of material to be effective, some biological weapons require very 
small amounts (as the infecting organism(s) may replicate and use the host as a dissemination device 
following an attack), which in turn demand far less storage capacity. Second, in contrast to both nuclear 
and chemical weapons materials, biological weapons materials do not require extensive precursor 
materials and equipment. Third, the processing and manipulation required with chemical and nuclear 
weapons generally leave traces that are more easily identified than those associated with biological 
weapons. Fourth, biological weapons agents are dual-use in nature; consequently, traces of biological 
weapons production cannot be easily differentiated from legitimate biological research or commercial 
activities. As a result, the ability of microorganisms to reproduce, coupled with their dual-use nature, 
makes concealment of a clandestine, offensive, biological weapons program relatively easy. Although 
such factors make biological weapons an attractive alternative to chemical and nuclear weapons, there 
remain numerous technical hurdles that must be overcome in order to develop an effective weapon. 
Scientific expertise is often needed to overcome the technical hurdles to biological weapons development 
and deployment, making it important to understand what individuals with varying levels of education and 
expertise would likely be able to accomplish. 
A high school biology student could probably culture and grow bacteria as well as provide assistance to a 
more advanced individual, but would likely be unable to do much more without detailed, specific 
David R. Franz, Cheryl D. Parrott, and Ernest T. Takafuji, “The U.S. Biological Warfare and Biological Defense 
Program,” Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I. Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty: Medical Aspects of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare, Falls Church: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Amy, 1997. 
203 
US General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of 204 
Chemical and Biological Attacks, September 1999. 
William C. Patrick 111, “Biological Warfare: An Overview,” Proliferation. Kathleen Bailey (Ed.), Livermore: 205 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1994. 
Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of BW Use 55 
instructions and oversight. One of the members of the RISE group was a gifted high school student who 
had formal training in biology. However, he was unable to develop a biological weapon.206 
A graduate with a two-year degree in a biology-related field could accomplish technical-level work. 
Individuals from these programs can prepare complex culture media, culture most aerobic and anaerobic 
gram positive and negative bacteria, culture viruses in eggs, and perform basic testing procedures to 
identify organisms. Typically, these individuals can assist formally trained scientists with experiments, 
diagnostic testing, etc. Five years as a technician is considered equivalent to a baccalaureate degree. 
Larry Wayne Harris was a technician.208 
207 
A baccalaureate degree in a biology-related program would give the individual a greater background in 
bacteriology, toxin production, host-parasite interactions, and exposure to virology and mycology. This 
background would enable the individual to undertake experiments under supervision of a trained scientist. 
He or she would also be qualified to work in a laboratory. Five years of work experience at the 
baccalaureate level is considered equivalent to a master’s degree. 209 
The next two groups of individuals are the junior scientist (graduate with a master’s degree) and the 
senior scientist (graduate with a Ph.D.). A junior scientist would have had extensive experience in the 
specialized field of microbiology. A junior scientist could head the microbiology section of a laboratory 
or work in the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industry, but would still be under some supervision. A 
junior scientist would be able to fully conceptualize problems in the form of formal hypothesis testing and 
evaluation. Typically, junior scientists can design, produce, and evaluate their own, original research. 
They would have full knowledge of pathogens and toxins, including ways to weaponize agents. A senior 
scientist would be able to perform all the tasks of a junior scientist as well as serve as the head of his or 
her own laboratory. 210 
However, scientists and engineers do not work alone; rather, they tend to work in teams. These collective 
human assets-separate from individual skill-become very important in evaluating needed expertise for 
*06 Information on technical expertise needed at various stages of BW research, development, and use comes from: 
Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques Chemical 
and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. This report is the 
result of experts pulled together by the National Defense University and the Monterey Institute for International 
Studies. A brief summary of this report by Raymond A. Zilinskas is available online at: 
http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/-1andnetIBioseclzilinskas 1 .pdf. 
’07 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
Jessica Stern, “Larry Wayne Harris (1998),” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons, Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000. 
’09 Raymond A, Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
’lo Ibid. 
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creating biological weapons. A strong set of human assets allows an agency or group to call upon specific 
expertise in areas related to biological weapons development and use. The full range of human assets 
includes individuals with backgrounds in microbiology, dissemination methods, and other areas that serve 
to improve the sophistication and effectiveness of biological weapons. This range of human assets could 
be met with a group as small as two people, a microbiologist and a physicist or mechanical engineer.211 
Potential sources of these human assets include the employees of the biotechnology sector and 
unemployed former bioweapons scientists from the FSU. In general, growing numbers of people are 
receiving increasingly sophisticated technical education and have access to the necessary tools. 
A related human asset is tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge involves the knowledge embedded in learning 
how to perform various tasks (e.g., thumping a cantaloupe to test for ripeness). While oral and written 
instructions may help to introduce the desired skill, to achieve mastery each individual must “learn by 
doing” and “learn by example.” In more formal terms, tacit scientific knowledge can be defined as, 
“knowledge or abilities that can be passed between scientists by personal contact, but cannot be, or has 
not been, set out or passed in formulae diagrams, or verbal descriptions and instructions for 
Tacit knowledge is usually a local phenomenon embodied in small groups of people who communicate 
this understanding by direct, personal interaction. 213,214 
Although the number of documented bioterrorism incidents has been increasing over the last century, the 
historical record shows that it has been difficult for groups to assemble the scientific expertise and 
materials necessary to develop a biological weapon that results in a high consequence event. Nonetheless, 
there has been a great deal of debate over whether or not a future incident will result in a high 
consequence event. The Aum Shinrikyo incident illustrates one side of the argument. Aum Shinrikyo 
acquired an avirulent strain of anthrax. 
The failure to acquire or develop a virulent strain came about despite the organization’s substantial 
funding, employment of several scientists with advanced degrees in biochemistry and microbiology, and 
It is unknown as to why they acquired an avirulent strain. 2 15,216 
Richard Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer. America‘s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, 211 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
H. M. Collins, “Tacit Knowledge, Trust, and the Q Sapphire,” Social Studies of Science, 31(1), 2001. 212 
Eugene S. Ferguson, “The Mind’s Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technology,” Science, 197(4306), August 26, 213 
1977. 
Kathleen Jordan and Michael Lynch, “The Sociology of a Genetic Engineering Technique: Ritual and 
Rationality in the Performance of the ‘Plasmid Prep”’ The Right Tools for the Job: At Work in Twentieth Century 
Life Sciences, Adele E. Clarke and Joan H. Fujimura (Eds), Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1992. 
214 
Kyle B. Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?’ Emerging Infectious Diseases. 5(4), JulyIAugust 215 
2000. 
216 W. J. Broad, S. Wu Dunn, and Judith Miller, “How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World,” The New York Times, 
May 26,1998. 
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Additionally, the cult’s biological 217,2 18 the creation of a sophisticated biological research facility. 
research facility never attracted the attention of the Japanese or other governments, allowing them to work 
without government intervention. Some have argued that if the well-funded, expert scientists working 
unimpeded for Aum Shinrikyo were unable to effectively create and disseminate infectious pathogens, it 
is not likely that terrorist organizations with fewer resources and less expertise could undertake a large- 
Others argue that this group, which came remarkably close to scale biological or chemical attack. 
producing a high consequence biological weapon, demonstrates the severity of the bioterrorist threat. 
219,220 
Those who consider the threat of a high consequence event to be severe often cite the significant physical 
damage and long term economic impacts resulting from the fall 2001 anthrax attacks. The economic 
impacts include not only the expense of the extensive decontamination procedures, but also the untold 
cost associated with placing tens of thousands of citizens on prophylaxis antibiotic treatment to prevent 
anthrax infection. In addition, the fall 200 1 anthrax attacks indicated that there are individual(s) who 
either have expertise or have access to that expertise, as well as the determination to use HCPTs. 
3.1 Acquisition of a Virulent Pathogen or Toxin 
The first step in creating a biological weapon is the acquisition of a virulent pathogen or toxin. While this 
may seem obvious, the process can be complicated. Some even claim that the acquisition of a virulent 
strain is the rate-limiting step.221 For example, Aum Shinrikyo was unable to obtain a virulent strain of 
anthrax. Although strains of a particular pathogen may be immunologically similar, they can vary widely 
in terms of pathogenicity, lethality, transmission rates, environmental susceptibility, as well as other 
factors. The ability to correctly identify whether a particular pathogen is virulent or avirulent is a 
necessary technical skill. The literature facilitates the identification process as it readily identifies 
pathogenic strains in terms of the above characteristics, including virulence. In addition to virulence, ten 
specific characteristics of a pathogen or toxin need to be evaluated depending on the type of biological 
weapon the state or substate actor hopes to produce. While each characteristic need not be optimal in 
order to result in successful biological weapons production, state programs have generally considered all 
ten in selecting agents for biological weapons production. The characteristics are as follows: (1) 
availability; (2) infectivity; (3) pathogenicity; (4) lethality; ( 5 )  transmissibility; (6) amplification; (7) 
processing; (8) the availability of countermeasures or population immunity; (9) environmental hardiness; 
and, (10) the ability to camouflage itself as an endemic or common disease. 
Barry Kellman, “Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,” Hurvurd Journal of Law 217 
and Policy. 24(471), Spring 2001. 
218 Jessica Stem, The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Kyle B. Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” Emerging Infectious Diseases, 5(4), July/August 219 
2000. 
Jonathan B. Tucker, “Bioterrorism is the Least of Our Worries,” The New York Times, October 16, 1999. 220 
Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US 22 1 
Response.” Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999. 
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3.1 .I Availability 
Most pathogens and toxins are available from a variety of sources. The first possible source is from 
nature. Human, animal, and plant disease outbreaks occur naturally throughout the world. These 
outbreaks are generally reported in a variety of trade and news publications as well as publicly available 
Internet disease surveillance systems such as ProMED.222 Consequently, a bioweaponeer could go to the 
location of an outbreak to collect the responsible pathogen or toxin. However, pathogens and toxins also 
exist in nature at sub-outbreak thresholds. The most notable example is anthrax. While information on 
anthrax, including location, types of animals afflicted, and general information on the strain?23 is widely 
available in public libraries, obtaining a viable sample is not as easy. A trained microbiologist would be 
needed to identify and isolate the material. This skill set would not be available to an untrained individual 
nor would it be easily mastered by reading a textbook on the subject. For example, the group Dark 
Harvest attempted to simply use soil from Gruinard Island as a biological weapon. Although the soil 
contained anthrax, it contained the pathogen in such a low concentration that this bioterrorism attack was 
ineffective.224 Therefore, not only must the bioweaponeer be able to cultivate the sample from name, but 
he/she must be able to overcome the enormous hurdle of time and effort required to sort through all of the 
strains of a particular pathogen found in nature, finding a suitable choice. For example, the time and effort 
required to find a suitably pathogenic strain in the approximately 675 strains of Clostridium botulinum 
found in nature would be considerable.225 
Microbial culture collections-both domestic and foreign-are a second source of pathogens and toxins. 
Before the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996, pathogen acquisition 
from microbial culture collections in the United States was not closely monitored. For example, the 
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) sold culture strains to Iraq in the 1980s. ATCC is a large 
clearinghouse that ships pathogens, requiring biological safety precautions to both domestic and 
international entities. Many of these pathogens are attenuated, avirulent strains, and could not be used 
directly as a biological weapon; however, they do provide valuable information for research and 
development programs. It should be noted that ATTC no longer ships “select agents”226 to any person or 
facility. 
Program for Monitoring Emerging Infectious Diseases (ProMED). http://www.fas.org/promed/ 222 
223 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Cams, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
W. Seth Cams, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit use of Biological Agents Since 1900. Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, DC, National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
224 
2001). 
Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US 225 
Response.” Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999. 
226 Listed in 7CFR 33.1, 9CFR 121.3,42CFR 73.4 
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Foreign microbial collections, another source of pathogens and toxins, present a greater risk for 
acquisition; ATCC estimates there could be as many as 450 global collections.227 Some of these global 
facilities belong to larger networks. For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) supports the Microbiological Resource Centers Network (MIRCEN). The 
network comprises 3 1 cultural collection centers in 25 nations.228 These facilities require some type of 
evidence that the person requesting a sample is, in fact, who they say they are and are associated with a 
credible facility. Although certification of proper credentials is now standard in the US, an individual who 
is legitimately employed at a facility could still acquire a pathogen or toxin for nefarious purposes. 
Standards for global acquisition from culture collections do not currently exist.229 Furthermore, 
consideration must be given to accommodating the necessary and standard research practice of 
laboratories sharing and transferring their research samples, enabling other laboratories to reproduce and 
build on their results. 
Laboratories and other research or clinical facilities are a third potential source of pathogens and toxins. 
Facilities include microbiology laboratories, hospitals, clinics, university laboratories, etc. In addition to 
those facilities within the US, there are numerous facilities overseas - including the FSU. The FSU is of 
particular concern because of the extensive Soviet biological weapons program. The program weaponized 
a variety of agents in numerous facilities collectively housed under Biopreparat. There is considerable 
concern that these materials may not be adequately protected. Security in the FSU is far below accepted 
security standards in the US. Additionally, FSU scientists and engineers receive subsistence salaries. This 
creates a two-fold risk: (1) facilities that can he easily accessed by adversaries who wish to steal 
pathogens or toxins, and (2) individuals who have legitimate access to pathogens or toxins who may be 
willing to remove material for monetary gain. 230 
3.1.2 Infectivity 
Infectivity is the capability of a pathogen or toxin to enter, survive in, and multiply in a susceptible host. 
Infectivity measures the number of organisms required to cause disease in a host, but does not necessarily 
translate to increased morbidity or mortality. High infectivity means fewer organisms are required to 
cause disease. 23 1 For example, Francisella tularensis is highly infectious: as few as 10 organisms can 
22’ Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
228 Edgar J. DaSilva, MIRCEN: Microbiological Resource Center, Paris, United Nations Scientific, Educational, and 
Cultural Organization, 1997. 
229 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
230 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
231 “Chapter 1: Introduction.” FM 8-9: NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations 
AMedP-6(B): Part 11 Biological, Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (no date). 
httn:, lW~~w.~nh.orrTiML.d.risp~GDef 3ch 1 .htm 
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cause tularemia after a 3-5 day incubation period. If left untreated, tularemia has a mortality rate of 30- 
60%. On the other hand, Brucella suis, also highly infectious, has a mortality rate of about 2%. 232 
The infectivity of anthrax is largely dependent on the manner in which bacteria comes into contact with a 
host [through the skin (cutaneous), by ingestion (gastrointestinal), or by inhalation into the lungs 
(inhalational)]. Anthrax is a bacterium that releases three dangerous toxins after entering an organism. 
Although anthrax has caused disease in animals throughout the world for centuries, the disease is 
uncommon among humans.233 Anthrax is most often found in herbivores that become infected by 
ingesting spores from the soil. There have been large outbreaks of anthrax in herbivores, such as a 1945 
anthrax epidemic in sheep in Iran resulting in one million sheep deaths;234 however, large-scale animal 
vaccination programs have dramatically reduced animal mortality.235 
Infectivity can be increased through manipulation. Pathogens use hydrolytic (water splitting) enzymes to 
damage or destroy proteins and lipids, the components of cellular membranes and walls. Increased 
infectivity can be achieved by enhancing production of these hydrolytic enzymes, or other enzymes that 
allow the pathogen to circumvent the hosts’ antibody system, or proteins that build receptors specific to 
the host cell being attacked; any of these mechanisms would be effective. A skilled biological weapons 
scientist may attempt to enhance the infectivity of any given organism in these or conceptually similar 
ways; however, only an advanced microbiologist would likely be able to achieve this level of 
manipulation. 236 
3.1.3 Pathogenicity 
Pathogenicity refers to the ability of a pathogen to inflict damage (i.e., disease) upon its host. 
Pathogenicity is displayed through virulence, which is a measure of the degree of pathogenicity. The 
mechanisms by which pathogens cause disease include their ability to invade a host organism 
(invasiveness) and their ability to produce toxins. As with infectivity, a biological weapons scientist may 
be able to increase pathogenicity by modifying the various characteristics of an organism. 237 
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 232 
Washington, DC, US Government Printing House, December 1993. 
D. Lew, “Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). Principles and Practices of Infectious Diseases, G. L. Mandell, J. E. 233 
Bennett, and R. Dolin (Eds), New York, NY, Churchill Livingstone, Inc., 1995. 
E. Kohout, A. Sehat, and M. Ashraf, “Anthrax: A Continuous Problem in South West Iran,” American Journal of 234 
Medical Science. 1964. 
U. V. Pienaar, “Epidemiology of Anthrax in Wild Animals and the Control on Anthrax Epizootics in the Kruger 235 
National Park, South Africa,” Federation Proceedings, 26, 1967. 
236 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
23’ Ibid. 
Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of BW Use 61 
Invasiveness includes not only the pathogen’s ability to invade and colonize a host, but also its ability to 
overcome host protections and produce extracellular substances that facilitate invasion. When a pathogen 
first enters a host, it must establish a colony. Part of this colonization includes bacterial adherence (or 
attachment) to a cell or tissue surface. Invasins (proteins) are extracellular molecules that aid in breaking 
down host defenses against the pathogen. They act to damage host cells so that the pathogen may 
invade. 
(cell-associated substances that are part of the cell structure) and exotoxins (released from cells). 
Endotoxins act locally while exotoxins may damage cells that are removed for the area of infection. 
238 Toxigenesis (the ability to produce toxins) includes the ability to produce both endotoxins 
239 
The host has a number of defenses associated with the immune system to protect itself from pathogens. 
The immune system is a set of inter-connected systems that identifies foreign bodies. Part of this system 
is the phagocytic process, or generalized immune response, which identifies and engulfs foreign 
invaders. 
avoiding engulfment, and avoiding digestion. Some bacteria, like Bacillus anthracis, are able to overcome 
some host protections. Bacillus anthracis is able to sporulate-a possible mechanism of avoiding 
destruction by the host’s phagocytes.241 
240 Pathogens may be able to overcome these defenses by avoiding contact with a phagocyte, 
3.1.4 Lethality 
The lethality of a pathogen or toxin refers to how likely its resultant disease will cause the death of its 
host. 
3.1.5 Transmissibility 
Transmissibility describes a pathogens’ ability to be conducted from one host to another, or a pathogens’ 
relative contag iou~ness .~~~ In addition to direct host-to-host transmission, such as through the air, 
pathogens may spread indirectly through a vector, such as a mosquito or flea. 243 
Kenneth Todar, The Mechanisms of Bacterial Pathogenicity, Department of Bacteriology, University of 238 
Wisconsin-Madison, 2002. http://www.bact.wisc.edu/Bact303/Bact303pathogenesis 
239 Ibid. 
240 Phillipe Chavrier, “May the Force Be With You: Myosin-X in Phagocytosis,” Nature Cell Biology. 4(7), July 
2002. http., /u.~vw nature.comiclzi-taflnvnaPace taf’!file- ncb iournal/v4in7 full/ncb0703-e169.html 
Kenneth Todar, The Mechanisms of Bacterial Pathogenicity, Department of Bacteriology, University of 241 
Wisconsin-Madison, 2002. httr,:/~~~.bact.wisc.eclu/Ract3031Bact3O3natl~o~encsis 
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243 “Chapter 1: Introduction,” FM 8-9: NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations 
AMedP-6(B, Part 11 Biological, Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, (no date). 
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3.1.6 Amplification 
Amplification or production is the culturing of a pathogen to grow the quantity of a pathogen or toxin. 
Different types of pathogens require different media in which to multiply. The material can be amplified 
more easily if the pathogen grows quickly (as an agent itself or the source of toxin), the nature of growth 
media is unsophisticated, and the required level of technical expertise is low. Additionally, while many 
agents can live outside of a host, viral agents cannot. Consequently, these types of agents would need 
additional manipulation to keep them viable during this amplification process. Larger quantities of 
material provide an adversary with more opportunities to infect a population [See Section 3.21 but, only 
small quantities of biological agents, capable of undergoing amplification, are necessary as starting 
material. Not only may an organism be amplified externally to provide enough material to spread widely, 
but as mentioned in Section 3.1.2, the ability of an organism to undergo amplification in its host is a key 
factor in determining infectivity, i.e. how much material would be required to adequately infect each host. 
3.1.7 Processing 
Processing refers to the degree to which a pathogen or toxin must be manipulated to facilitate dispersal. 
The material is processed to accomplish three specific events: (1) to resist environmental stressors, (2) to 
survive dissemination, and (3) to increase the pathogen or toxin infectivity andor pathogenicity. [See also 
Section 3.31 If high levels of processing are required to make an effective weapon, potential technical 
difficulties with the processing may render the biological materials useless as a weapon (e.g., imperfect 
particulate size may not be pathogenic). 
3.1.8 Available Countermeasures and/or Immunity 
Easily available countermeasures or high levels of immunity in the population directly impacts the 
effectiveness of a biological weapon. Available countermeasures include vaccines, antibiotics, and other 
types of prophylaxis and therapeutic treatments that could be used to reduce the affect of a biological 
weapons attack andor protect individuals involved in pathogen or toxin manipulation from becoming 
infected themselves. However, different types of agents require different forms of intervention. Bacteria 
are living organisms that reproduce by simple cell division. Most bacteria are susceptible to specific 
therapy with antibiotics. By contrast, viruses reproduce only within living cells of a host organism. The 
diseases they produce generally do not respond to antibiotic treatment; however, antiviral therapies are 
available for certain types of viral infections. Vaccines may also protect an individual from the onslaught 
of viral disease. Rickettsiae are microorganisms that have characteristics similar to both bacteria (they 
require oxygen to live) and viruses (they require other living cells for growth). They are susceptible to 
broad spectrum antibiotics. Fungi are plants that do not use photosynthesis and are capable of anaerobic 
growth. Fungi tend to respond to antimicrobial intervention. Finally, toxins are produced by and derived 
from living plants, animals, and microorganisms. Certain toxins may also be produced by chemical 
means. Antisera and selected pharmacological agents can counter the effects of these poisons. 244 
In addition to medical intervention, other types of countermeasures are available to prevent the outbreak 
of disease. Universal health precautions involve a number of different barrier protections. These 
244 Ibid. 
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protections, while not necessarily destroying the pathogen or toxin, limit their ability to contaminate a 
susceptible host. Barriers include gloves, masks, gowns, aprons, and goggles. Additionally, simple 
disinfectants used to sterilize surfaces can prevent infection. An example of the importance of universal 
health precautions involves the disease Ebola. Ebola is a hemorrhagic fever first recognized in 1976. The 
reservoir, the passive carrier, for Ebola is currently unknown. First seen in Zaire, now the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ebola causes its victims to bleed profusely leading, in most cases, to death. 
Traditional burial practices in Zaire called upon family members to retrieve a loved one following death 
and bathe him or her. Unprotected contact by the family member with deceased’s blood often resulted in 
new infection. Implementing barrier measures as well as simple disinfectant regimes dramatically cut the 
rate of infection. 
countermeasures. These types of equipment give the wearer a self-contained environment and prevent 
exposure to a particular pathogen or toxin. This type of equipment is generally not available to the public. 
245,246 . Finally, respirators and biosafety-rated protective suits provide additional 
Pathogens and toxins that are susceptible to these types of countermeasures will have less impact than 
those pathogens and toxins for which there are no known, well-developed or widely available treatments. 
State programs have traditionally pursued those pathogens or toxins that are susceptible to 
countermeasures because states generally have an obligation to protect their own citizenry. In the event of 
a biological attack, pathogens or toxins could easily “blow back” to their state of origin; they could also 
spread to other unintended, undesired targets. Substate actors, however, generally have different 
motivations, and may not take into consideration available countermeasures. However, both the 
Rajneeshee attack and the fall 2001 anthrax attacks used pathogens (Salmonella @phi and Bacillus 
anthracis) that could be treated with medical intervention. 
3.1.9 Environmental Hardiness 
Environmental hardiness is the ability of an individual pathogen or toxin ability to survive outside of a 
host. For example, anthrax is very hardy; it can survive for 20 years or longer outside of a host organism 
because of its ability to 
ultraviolet light and may not survive long outside of a host organism. Viral agents can only reproduce 
inside living cells and, therefore, need to be stabilized after production in order to prevent (or slow down) 
degradation. Relative hardiness may serve to increase probability of use, not only because it leads to 
continued exposure and illness, but because it increases the likelihood of successful deployment. 
By contrast, some viruses are particularly sensitive to heat and 
The environmental hardiness of an agent determines the storage and dissemination procedures that must 
be used if it is to be deployed as a weapon. While storage may only involve monitoring temperature and 
protecting against light sources, the requirements may be much more extensive, and these two factors 
alone may necessitate large investments in equipment. This equipment, in turn, may impact the manner in 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, “Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever,” Special Pathogens Branch, 245 
http://www.cdc.govlncidodldvrdlspblmnpages/dispages/ebola.h~ 
Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health, New York, NY: Hyperion, 2000. 246 
247 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Washington, DC, US Government Printing House, December 1993. 
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which the material can be transported. Storage and transportation containers must not leak or degrade the 
virulence or viability of the pathogen of toxin. Susceptibility to natural elements during dissemination 
also presents unique problems for maintaining the virulence or viability of a pathogen or toxin. Many 
viral agents are degraded or destroyed by light or heat; consequently, they could not be effectively 
disseminated with a missile or explosives, or even during daylight hours. Along with the technical 
difficulties in identifying and harvesting any given pathogen or toxin, a secondary skill set must be 
developed in order to store and disseminate the pathogen or toxin in such a way that it does not degrade 
the agent’s ability to be an effective weapon. 
3.1 .I 0 Ability to be Camouflaged 
The extent to which a biological attack can be camouflaged to present as an endemic or common disease 
outbreak may be considered an important attribute. Pathogens and toxins that can be camouflaged are 
generally more attractive agents because they would discourage immediate attribution and improve the 
perpetrator’s chances of escaping undetected. However, some substate actors may want to receive credit 
and notoriety for successfully deploying a biological weapon. 
3.2 Production of Material 
Once a pathogen or toxin has been chosen, the quantity used becomes an important factor. As described 
in Section 3.1.2, large amounts of material may be required for reliable infectivity upon dissemination. 
Therefore, it is desired to be able to calculate how much material is needed to injure or kill the desired 
number of individuals. Moreover, such calculations also need to factor in the anticipated die-off rate for 
the pathogen (ie., how many organisms would likely succumb to environmental stressors) as well as 
predict how much of the organism would likely come into contact with members of the target population. 
Material production to increase the quantities of pathogen is often the simplest step. Once the biological 
agent has been chosen based on the preceding ten characteristics, a seed culture must be obtained by one 
or more of the mechanisms detailed in Section 3.1.1. This seed culture is then injected into a flask or 
fermenter containing appropriate growth media. Different types of pathogens and toxins require different 
media in which to multiply. While most bacteriological agents can survive outside of a host, viral agents 
cannot; consequently, viruses require additional manipulation. However the necessary recipes, supplies, 
and equipment are all easy to obtain and many of these items may be obtained in pre-packaged “kits”. At 
all times, agents are susceptible to environmental degradation, requiring special precautions be taken to 
preserve the integrity of the agents during this process. Additionally, during this amplification process, 
the technician needs to watch for contaminants or genetic mutations that could weaken the biological 
agent. 248 
Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US 248 
Response.” Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999. 
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3.3 Processing of Material 
Material is processed to accomplish three goals: (1) to resist environmental stressors; (2) to survive 
dissemination; and (3) to increase the pathogen or toxin infectivity and/or pathogenicity. 
As discussed throughout Section 3 ,  pathogens and toxins are susceptible to environmental degradation. 
Different pathogens and toxins, however, may be more susceptible to different types of environmental 
stressors. For example, viral agents are more susceptible to ultraviolet light than are bacterial agents. 
Consequently, in order to process a pathogen or toxin for eventual use as a biological weapon, a level of 
expertise with the particular material identified for use must be present. This expertise would be needed to 
both grow and store material without losing virulence. 
The second type of processing involves manipulating the material to survive dissemination. This step 
would require expertise on not only the particular pathogen or toxin, but also on dissemination methods. 
Not all dissemination methods are viable for any pathogen or toxin. Anthrax is generally not susceptible 
to most environmental stressors; however, in order to have the most effective impact on a target 
population, it should be processed to a small enough sporulate that it can easily be inhaled and lodged in 
the victim’s respiratory tract. This particular type of skill requires knowledge and experience in aerosol 
technology. Successful dissemination would also be aided by experience in overcoming electrostatic 
attraction to prevent clumping and microencapsulation of the agent to decrease its environmental 
susceptibility. 
The level of processing depends on the state of the pathogenic material. Liquid agents are easy to 
produce. The only further processing required after amplification might include the addition of stabilizers. 
The creation of dry agents requires the produced material to be either spray dried or freeze dried 
(lyophilized) and then milled to achieve the optimal particle size for inducing pulmonary infections. As 
preeminent former US bioweaponeer William Patrick recognized, liquid agents are easy to produce but 
are more difficult to successfully disseminate while dry agents are more difficult to produce but are 
relatively easy to disseminate. 
crude dissemination and both can be aerosolized. Dry agents are typically more robust and likely to 
survive the aerosolization process. 
249 As discussed below (Section 3.4), dry and liquid agents are suitable for 
Finally, processing material to increase a pathogen’s or toxin’s infectivity andor pathogenicity requires a 
highly specialized expertise that combines knowledge of a particular pathogen or toxin with knowledge of 
genetics and DNA processes. In order to increase aspects of a pathogen’s or toxin’s DNA profile, an 
individual would need to know not only what particular part of the DNA strand needs to be modified, but 
also how to modify it. This may involve the use of specialized equipment (such as a DNA splicer) that 
would likely be available only to well-funded organizations. 
William C .  Patrick, 111, “Biological Terrorism and Aerosol Dissemination,” Politics and the Life Sciences 15(2) 249 
September 1996. 
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3.4 Employing a Delivery Form and Device 
Dissemination is the process of spreading a pathogen or toxin to cause infection. Similar to natural 
outbreaks of disease, intentional outbreaks rely on the same pathways for infection: inhalation, ingestion, 
or percutaneous inoculation.250 Methods for dissemination range from crude to sophisticated. The two 
successful bioterrorist attacks in the US both used crude dissemination methods. In the first case, the 
Rajneeshee cult simply placed samples of salmonella on salad bars. In the second case, an unknown actor 
or actors mailed weaponized anthrax in envelopes. Neither agent was particularly susceptible to the 
environment. Additionally, neither attack resulted in a mass casualty event. A future act of bioterrorism, 
using a different dissemination method could produce more catastrophic results than either of these two 
events. 
3.4.1 Inhalation via Aerosolization 
Inhalation of a pathogen or toxin requires it be aerosolized; both liquid and dry agents can be aerosolized. 
However, the mechanical stresses inherent in the aerosolization process of liquid slurrys can destroy most 
of the path~gen.~’’ A biological weapon delivery system that relies on aerosolization would likely aim to 
disseminate particulates 10 microns or less in diameter. Smaller particles can remain airborne for longer 
periods of time than larger particles. However, a diameter of less than 0.5 microns tends to result in 
unstable particles that are more susceptible to environmental degradation. The upper respiratory tract can 
become infected with particles as large as 20 microns, but these larger particles are more likely to be 
filtered out by natural processes. Experts generally agree that inhalation infection requires far fewer 
organisms than ingestion or percutaneous inoculation.252 There is widespread disagreement in the 
literature regarding the possible success of a biological attack using low technology methods for aerosol 
generation (e.g. hand-held .spray cans, truck-mounted sprayers).253 The underlying issue is a disagreement 
on how successful an attack could be that relies on a dissemination technique with a lower yield of 
aerosolized particles within the optimal size range. Access to higher technology methods may become 
more prevalent as the pharmaceutical industry actively researches and develops methods for the aerosol 
delivery of medical drugs. This provides a pool of knowledge and equipment that could potentially be 
used for the aerosol delivery of pathogens. 
“Chapter 1 Introduction.” FM 8-9: NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations 
AMedP-6(B): Part 11 Biological. Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, (no date). 
httn:/ xvww.vnh.org ‘ ~ l ~ ( i A s ~ N H ~ i ~ ~ f  2ch 1 .htm 
250 
W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit use of Biological Agents Since 1900. Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, DC, National Defense University, August 1998 (Revised February 
2001). p. 23. 
251 
252 “Chapter 1: Introduction.” FM 8-9: NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations 
AMedP-6(B): Part IT Biological. Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, (no date). 
h ~ : l ~ u w w . v t i h . o r ~ / ~ l e ~ ~ A  spN HCDef 2ch 1 .htm 
Amy E. Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US 253 
Response.” (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), p. 53-54. 
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The methods for aerosol dispersal may affect the effectiveness of a pathogen as a weapon. There are three 
general types of dispersal: (1) point-source dispersal, (2) multiple-point-source dispersal, and ( 3 )  line- 
source dispersal. 
Point-source dispersal involves the release of a pathogen or toxin from a stationary source (e.g., bomblets, 
artillery shells, a suitcase). Point-source dispersal may be either indoors (e.g., into a closed-air system) or 
outdoors. Aum Shinrikyo used point-source dispersal; however, they were unable to harvest a virulent 
strain of Bacillus anthracis and thus failed to deploy a successhl weapon.254 
Multiple-point-source dispersal uses the same techniques as point-source dispersal but has multiple 
release points. Aum Shinrikyo also carried out crude multiple-point-source dispersal using briefcases 
equipped with small fans and tanks of pathogens for dispersal. 
Line-source dispersal involves a prolonged release of a pathogen or toxin from a source that is in motion. 
Aum Shinrikyo attempted this type of dissemination as well, using both Bacillus anthracis and 
Clostridium botulinum. The bacteria were not properly processed for aerosolized dissemination; 
consequently, the nozzle of the sprayer became clogged. In order for this type of device to be effective, 
the spore must be small enough to easily pass through a nozzle. The cult was unable to grow Clostridium 
botulinum (although they believed that they had). They did disperse something, but not their intended 
pathogen. This requires knowledge of spray devices and a specialized skill set that enables agent 
manipulation. The spray device can be used from an airplane (such as a crop duster) or another type of 
ground t ran~por ta t ion .~~~ 
Aerosolized agents may be more susceptible to environmental degradation than agents designed for 
ingestion or percutaneous inoculation and aerosolized biological weapons have the potential for a delayed 
reaction. To address the problem of environmental degradation, infectious agents may be processed to 
survive outside of a host or outside of ideal storage situations for long periods of time. Such an agent 
would be able to re-infect host organisms under certain conditions. The Sverdlosk incident of 1979 
(discussed in Section 2.1.2) provides a good example of this phenomenon. After the initial accidental 
release of processed anthrax, the Sverdlovsk Communist party leader, Boris Yeltsin, ordered a clean-up of 
the city. This inadvertently caused spores that had settled in cracks in the street and other hidden areas to 
be stirred back into the air again, causing more casualties. The outbreak lasted approximately six weeks 
before the final victim was diagnosed. 256,257 
Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Cams, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 254 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
255 Ibid. 
Alex Neifert, “Case Study: Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979,” Report to the Camber Corporation, 2000. 256 
httn: lwu-w.nhc-nied.oralSiteContentlMedReflOnlineRefiCaseStudies cssverdlovsk. html 
Jan Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, University of California Press, 1999. 257 
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3.4.2 Ingestion 
A biological weapon also can be designed to cause infection through ingestion. This dissemination 
method would involve contaminating food, water, or medical supplies. This type of dissemination is 
similar to early biological weapons use, and it is primarily a method of sabotage. The Ranjneeshee cult 
deployed its biological weapon-Salmonella typhi-to cause infection through ingestion. 
Some commentators have suggested that municipal water supplies are at high risk of contamination by a 
biological weapon. But many biological weapons experts have argued that filtration, chlorination, and 
dilution processes, combined with the large numbers of organisms required to cause infection through 
ingestion, make the contamination of the municipal water system a low-probability, low consequence 
event.258 
3.4.3 Percutaneous Inoculation 
A biological weapon also can be designed to cause infection through percutaneous inoculation. This 
dissemination method would aim to infect by dermal exposure. While intact skin provides most hosts with 
adequate protection against most biological agents, damaged skin or mucous membranes constitute 
weaknesses that may allow pathogen penetration.259 Because large areas of damaged skin are rare, 
percutaneous inoculation usually results in limited, non-lethal exposure. The victims of cutaneous 
anthrax from the fall 2001 attacks in the United States were treated and successfully recovered from the 
disease. It is extremely unlikely that a biological weapon, disseminated to cause infection through 
percutaneous inoculation, could cause a high casualty event. 
3.4.4 Other Dissemination Methods 
Although the three prime routes of infection are inhalation, ingestion, and percutaneous inoculation, 
biological weapons programs have researched other types of dissemination methods. Of particular interest 
is the use of vectors. Vectors are other organisms that carry pathogens to their host. A small sample of 
known vectors include the flea (plague), mosquito (yellow fever and malaria), and mice (hantavims). It is 
theoretically possible to purposively introduce a pathogen into a targeted population via one of a number 
of vectors; however, this method would require an additional skill set, such as expertise in the field of 
entomology. 
Other methods of dissemination include purposively infecting an individual who would then spread the 
disease to others. However, this would not be an effective method for all diseases. This would be effective 
with diseases such as influenza, which is contagious during its prodromal stage, when an individual is 
258 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
259 Jan Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak, University of California Press, 1999. 
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contagious, but not showing any symptoms. By contrast, smallpox is only contagious after the 
characteristic rash appears; however, by that time the infected individual is virtually bed-ridden.260 
Finally, directly injecting the pathogen or toxin into a targeted victim would also be a possible 
dissemination method. In 1978, a Bulgarian dissident was assassinated when ricin was directly injected 
into him. It is highly unlikely that this method would result in mass casualties. 
3.4.5 Environmental Considerations 
Once a biological weapon is dispersed, weather conditions play an important role in distributing the agent 
widely. Weather conditions may also hinder the agent's effectiveness. Factors such as relative humidity, 
temperature, altitude, sunlight, wind, and the inversion layer can impact the effective dissemination, 
viability, and virulence of any pathogen or toxin. Additionally, each pathogen or toxin has its own 
environmental susceptibilities and sensitivities. Consequently, knowledge of one pathogen and its 
susceptibility to environmental stressors does not translate into knowledge of other pathogens. 26 1 
If a biological weapon is to be deployed outside, individuals with knowledge of meteorology would be 
necessary to ensure precise dispersal. Weather patterns vary not only from location to location 
(horizontally), but also from altitude to altitude (vertically). Consequently, the ability to identify 
appropriate weather conditions and advise those involved in the processing of material as to where the 
agent is most likely to hit -and how many organisms are likely to survive-is essential. 
Attempts to deploy a pathogen or toxin in a closed environment, such as a subway system, eliminates 
some of the meteorological issues but create a different set of possible problems. To optimally deploy 
indoors requires an extensive knowledge of not only forced, or closed, air systems, but also extensive 
knowledge of the type of system a specific target uses. Additionally, knowledge regarding possible 
filtration systems, air flow patterns, and maintenance schedules may be required in order to advise the 
processors of biological weapons how to create a weapon to overcome these obstacles. Covert indoor 
deployment of a biological agent may be able to partially compensate for these difficulties because the 
confined space can create prolonged exposure times. 
3.5 Other Factors 
Other factors to consider when evaluating the technical requirements for a state or substate actor to 
successfully deploy a biological weapon include: (1)  facilities and equipment, (2) whether or not field 
testing will be undertaken before dissemination, and (3) whether or not advanced biotechnology skills are 
required. In general, each of these factors is important to each of the above outlined steps. 
260 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Carus, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
261 Ibid. 
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Facilities and equipment range from the “basement lab” to advanced, state-run research facilities. Both 
require minimal investment in basic equipment (e.g., flasks, vials, incubators, burners, and culture media). 
This type of equipment is not regulated; therefore, purchasing this equipment as an individual (and not 
through a facility) would not raise any suspicions. With this basic equipment an individual could grow 
certain types of pathogens or toxins. To culture a virus, embryonated eggs or cell cultures and a minimum 
level of scientific knowledge are required. More advanced pathogen or toxin manipulation would require 
more sophisticated research facilities and equipment. For example, if the goal were development of a 
crude liquid formulation of anthrax as a biological weapon, the basic equipment listed above would 
suffice. However, development of a more sophisticated dry agent would require drying and milling 
equipment as well as the ability to operate this equipment. Thus, more complicated pathogen or toxin 
manipulation requires more investment in equipment, facilities, and expertise.262 Any state with a vaccine 
plant is equipped to manufacture bioweapons. Cost estimates for a full suite of laboratory and production 
equipment range from $2 million to less than $200,000.263 Kathleen Bailey, a national security analyst, 
estimates that a minimal bioterrorist facility could be constructed, and be successful, with $10,000 in 
equipment and fit within a room that measured 15 x 15 feet.264 Moreover, with the worldwide spread of 
biotechnology, these costs can be expected to continually decrease. 
Field testing is probably most relevant to state programs. Prior to making a weapon -any weapon - 
available for military use, most states would likely undertake a series of field tests to identify the 
weapon’s overall efficacy. Field tests are important in the world of biological weapons because 
environmental factors can easily undermine these weapons. Additionally, loading biological weapons into 
munitions creates operational problems. Putting together a field test under probable attack conditions 
requires not only a background with biological weapons but also, in all likelihood, a background in 
military tactics, meteorology, and conventional weapons.265 Substate actors may be willing to use their 
first deployment as a substitute for more rigorous pre-trial field testing. 
Advanced biotechnology encompasses advances in DNA technologies, genetics, protein and nucleic acids 
sequencing, functional genomic, genetic, and protein engineering, and cell and tissue culturing. Each of 
these areas requires further specialization involving individuals, equipment, and facilities. Biological 
weapons using advanced biotechnology techniques are more likely to be pursued by state programs than 
substate actors.266 
262 Ibid. 
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 263 
Washington, DC, US Government Printing House, December 1993. p. 86. 
264 Richard Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer. America‘s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
265 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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3.6 Summary 
The historical record shows that states and well-funded, scientifically competent terrorist groups have 
encountered difficulties in one or more of the steps for BW production and use. 267 Although these 
hurdles are not insurmountable, they do provide some measure of deterrence. 
In particular, obtaining a pathogen or toxin does not ensure production of a biological weapon that will 
produce a high consequence event. First of all, if an avirulent strain of a pathogen is chosen, no 
significant outbreak of disease will occur.268 Even after the right strain is selected, additional hurdles face 
the bioterrorist, including isolation, amplification, protection against environmental degradation, and 
development of an effective dissemination method. 
Most HCPTs are not dermally active. Therefore, to cause incapacitation or death, these agents must enter 
a susceptible host either through ingestion or inhalation. Since most pathogens and toxins would not 
survive human digestive processes, aerosolization of agents for inhalation has been acknowledged to be 
Thus, the perpetrator needs to the most effective method for a mass casualty biological attack. 
master the skills to optimize particle size and to decrease vulnerability from environmental stressors. 
Then the bioterrorist must be able to select and use an appropriate delivery system. These steps require 
269,270 
27 1 
In a forthcoming book, Malicious Motives: Assessing Terrorist Motivations and Behavioral Patterns, edited by 
John Parachini, 15 cases studies of specific international terrorist groups such as the PKK, IRA, Hezbollah, Tamil 
Elam, and A1 Qaeda are examined. In the public media, there are frequent allegations of the interest in or use of BW 
by these groups. The book, however, finds that in virtually every case, with the exception of AI Qaeda, there is no 
evidence that any of these groups produced any biological agents. Evidence regarding A1 Qaeda seems to indicate 
only interest and the purchase of some laboratory equipment and supplies. In addition, detailed case studies of other 
terrorist groups such as RISE, the Red Army Faction, Minnesota Patriots Council, and the Weather Underground 
reveal a lack of technical skill and organization necessary for the development of mass casualty biological weapons. 
See also Jonathan B. Tucker (Ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. David Johnston and James Risen, “U.S. Concludes A1 Qaeda Lacked a Chemical or 
Biological Stockpile,” The New York Times, March 20, 2002. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says It Found Qaeda Lab 
Being Built to Produce Anthrax.” The New York Times, March 23,2002. 
261 
268 The elderly, children, and immune-compromised individuals may still be susceptible to disease because of their 
weak immune systems. 
269 Even for botulinum toxin, the toxin would need to be concentrated in order for a small quantity to be effective in 
a food or beverage attack. Further, highly concentrated botulinum toxin is unstable unless correctly formulated. 
270 Raymond A. Zilinskas and W. Seth Cams, Possible Terrorist Use of Modern Biotechnology Techniques 
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, US Department of Defense, April 2002. 
271 In the fall 2001 Bacillus anthracis attacks, the quality of Bacillus anthracis used varied. The Bacillus anthracis 
samples sent to US Senators Daschle and Leahy were determined to be of a high concentration and purity, milled to 
yield a small particle size, and specially treated to eliminate static charge and promote aerosolization. However, 
many of these modifications to the Bacillus anthracis strain could have resulted, in whole or part, from past national 
biodefense activities. Therefore, at the present time, it is impossible to determine whether the perpetrator(s) had the 
technical skill to produce such high quality Bacillus anthracis or merely stole the material. 
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moderate to high levels of scientific expertise and pose distinct obstacles to both states and 
terrorists. 
state and substate actors are becoming more capable with time.274 
However, the technical hurdles for weaponizing biological agents are constant while the 272,273 
Finally, although a discussion of the technical hurdles is important, we must recognize that a bioterrorist 
need not face all of these challenges; if the bioterrorist obtains an HCPT from a research facility, he or she 
would not need to invest as many resources-including people-to produce an effective biological 
weapon agent. While this advantage is by no means insignificant, the bioterrorist would still need t o -  
depending on the agent acquired-process and/or deploy the biological weapons material. 
Elisa Harris, "Russia, Iraq and Other Potential Sources of Anthrax, Smallpox and Other Terrorist Weapons." 
Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives. 1 07th Congress, 
December 5,2001. 
272 
273 US General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of 
Chemical and Biological Attacks, September 1999. 
Richard Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer. America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, 214 
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of BW Use 73 
4. Conclusion 
The fall 2001 anthrax attacks raised awareness of bioterrorism and intensified the debate over the nature 
of the threat. By combining a comparative historical analysis with an examination of the technical hurdles 
associated with successful biological weapons development and deployment, this study presents a holistic 
threat assessment that can be used to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter the biological weapons 
threat. 
Historically, states have been responsible for the majority of biological weapons proliferation, but for a 
variety of reasons have rarely used the weapons they produced. First, biological weapons tend to be 
imprecise and ineffective in war, and states their feared use would engender overwhelming reprisal. In 
addition, the post-WWII era of nonproliferation spawned an increasing attitude of disapproval towards 
the use of biological weapons, as evidenced by the BWC. As biological weapons were seen as 
increasingly unattractive, many states chose to relinquish their programs. While many states possessed the 
resources and expertise to overcome the technical hurdles to produce biological weapons, these weapons 
remained of limited utility. 
In the past, substate actors, lacking state resources, have had little capacity to develop high consequence 
biological weapons. Nonetheless, substate actors have on numerous occasions used biological weapons to 
produce low consequence events. In contrast to states, their use of biological weapons have not been 
confined to war; therefore issues such as protecting civilian populations and adhering to international 
norms of behavior were not disincentives to use. Nor was fear of attribution necessarily a consideration. 
However, substate actors’ efforts at bioterrorism have been ineffective and have generally resulted in low 
consequence events, primarily because of the difficulty in overcoming technical hurdles. 
To produce an accurate threat assessment, one must consider the current state of world affairs as well as 
the dominant trends that will shape the future. The major trend affecting the biological weapons threat is a 
marked rise in terrorist activity. Many recent terrorist incidents have been carried out by highly organized 
and well-funded organizations, a troubling development as-unlike terrorists of the past-these groups 
exhibit an increased desire for mass casualties. Some of these organizations are well positioned to take 
advantage of several features of the BW “landscape”: the wide availability of dangerous pathogens and 
toxins, the growing availability of BW-related equipment, and the possibility of procuring biological 
weapons materials and expertise from the FSU and other nations. In addition, bioterrorists can take 
advantage of the numerous technological changes that have reduced the technical and financial hurdles to 
biological weapons development. The growing biotechnology industry provides an increasingly large 
base of knowledge and expertise. Moreover, antibiotic or vaccine resistant strains may increase the 
likelihood of a high consequence event. 
Even though the technical and financial hurdles to acquiring a biological weapon are lowering over time, 
a high consequence biological weapon event resulting in mass casualties implies the utilization of a 
highly skilled, organized, and financed network of individuals. Such resources would be necessary in 
order to weaponize and deploy the appropriate agents. To succeed in producing a mass casualty event, 
agents-such as smallpox, anthrax, or plague-must be selected andor engineered to exhibit some 
combination of high lethality, transmissibility, and infectivity, and would most likely need to be deployed 
in aerosolized form. Because of the considerable number of technical hurdles and financial resources 
required for producing a high consequence, mass casualty event, this outcome remains unlikely. Similar 
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challenges would be associated with high consequence events that do not produce mass casualties, but 
that may cause extreme physical damage, economic impact, or social disintegration. 
A low consequence biological weapons event is one that does not result in mass casualties or other forms 
of damage. Producing a low consequence event requires less skill, organization, and funding than that 
required for a high consequence event. A variety of attack methods may be used, and a wide range of 
agents could be employed to cause a lower consequence bioweapons event. Generally, even low 
consequence events require a considerable level of expertise. In addition, the objectives of the 
perpetrators may be more easily realized by other means, such as conventional explosives. 
However, certain types of low consequence events may be more probable. They include events 
committed by lone actors, both terrorist acts and biocrimes. These differ considerably from other types of 
low consequence events because they require little organization, funding, and expertise. Because these 
acts are carried out by one or a few individuals, they are less likely to be detected or prevented. Of the 
two categories (terrorist acts and biocrimes), biocrimes are the most likely to occur. Biocrimes are 
generally targeted attacks, such as assassinations or murders. Although, in this study, biocrimes are 
omitted from the discussion of substate actors-because they do not constitute terrorist acts-they are 
nonetheless worthy of note. These attacks require a very low level of organization and expertise, and 
have, to date, involved a limited class of agents, such as botulinum toxin and ricin. However, they may 
also include non-lethal agents. Because biocrime attacks can easily be carried out by a lone actor with a 
moderate level of technical expertise, they are more likely to occur. However the consequences will be 
minimal, resulting in a single death or temporary illness; generally, biocrimes cannot inflict mass 
casualties or the other forms of damage that designate an event as high consequence. 
I n  conclusion, this study produces the following biological weapons threat assessment. The near-term 
threat from terrorists comes in the form of the deployment of existing agents while state actors could 
access the resources necessary to develop and deploy existing or genetically engineered agents. Although 
many states have the capacity to produce a high consequence event, it is unlikely. Rogue states are the 
most likely biological weapons perpetrators, and most can probably be deterred by retaliation with other 
weapons of mass destruction or overwhelming conventional force. The vast majority of substate actors 
are likely to continue providing a greater threat of conducting a low consequence biological weapons 
event. The main threat comes from highly organized, well financed terrorist groups, particularly those that 
desire mass casualties. The probability of such groups producing a high consequence bioterrorist event is 
currently low but increasing. 
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